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REBOOTING TRADEMARKS FOR THE TWENTYFIRST CENTURY
Doris Estelle Long

Trademarks have long suffered from an "ugly stepsister" status in the realm of
intellectualproperty. Quasi-marketregulation tool, quasi-investmentproperty; trademark's
historicalrole as both consumer-informationsignifier andproducer-investmentasset has led
to increasingly confusing dichotomous treatment under the Lanham Act. The potentially
borderless markets ofcyberspace, with their new marketing techniques and new competitive
spaces, have only heightened this confision. Stumbling attempts to extend protectionfor
marks under the Lanham Act beyond traditionalnotions of trademark use and consumer
confusion to encompass the investment protection side of trademarks, such as the
development offederal dilution and anti-ybersquattingacts, only serve to twist trademark
law into unnecessary and ultimately useless contortions. Instead of ignoring the
dichotomous nature of trademarks, it is time to "reboot" the Lanham Act to recognize that
the dual role of trademarks cannot be adequately protected by a legal regime that ignores
such dichotomies. In such new, competitive spaces on the Internet as domain names,
keywords, pop-up advertisements, and metatags, traditionalnotions of trademark use and
consumer conftsion have little relevance. It is time to acknowledge the evolved nature of
trademarks as both traditional reputation-based source designators and nontraditional
information assets, and revise the law to refect the diferent protection norms requiredfor
these two different types of "marks."
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REBOOTING TRADEMARKS FOR THE TWENTYFIRST CENTURY
Dons Estelle Long*
I. INTRODUCTION

Trademarks' may arguably have a longer lived existence than their
other intellectual property relations-patents and copyrights-since "source
designators" have been found on pottery created over 4000 years ago. 2
Such long existence, however, does not guarantee that the legal foundations
for the protection of trademarks is well theorized. To the contrary, at least
in connection with the development of Anglo-American legal traditions,
trademarks have suffered from a confusingly dichotomous nature that has
only become more pronounced as demands on its information-signifying
functions have multiplied in the twenty-first century. Trademarks have
never had an easy existence under U.S. legal traditions. The last of the
intellectual property triumvirate of patents, copyrights, and trademarks to
achieve federal statutory protection,' trademarks were long ago relegated to
stepsister status by the U.S. Supreme Court. In reviewing the first attempt

' Professor of Law and Chair of the Intellectual Property, Infomation Technology and Privacy Group at
TheJohn Marshall Law School, in Chicago, Illinois. I would like to thank the organizers of the Symposium on
Intellectual Property at the University of Louisville, Brandeis School of Law whose invitation was the spark that
triggered the writing of this Article. I would also like to thank the Symposium participants for their helpful
comments on an earlier draft. Special thanks to Allison Schneider and Katie Pimentel for their able research
assistance. This Article is dedicated to the students in my IP Digital classes who continually open my eyes to the
new possibilities and challenges of the Digital Age. As always, any errors belong solely to me.
I I am using the terms "trademarks" and "marks" interchangeably to refer to any term, phrase, device,
symbol, logo, or sign that serves to distinguish one undetaking's goods and/or services fhmm those of another. See
15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006) (defining a trademark as "any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination
thereof. . . to identify and distinguish his or her goods"); Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights art. 15, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex IC, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 [hereinafter TRIPS] (defining trademarks as "[a]ny sign, or any combination of
signs, capable of distinguishing the goods or services ofone undertaking 6mm those ofother undertakings").

2 SeeFRANK 1. ScHEcI- ER, THE HIsTORicAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE IAW RELATING TO TRADEMARKS 20 (1925); see also WIUJAM H. BROWNE, A TREATISE ON THE IAW OF TRADE-MARKS AND
ANALOGOUS SUBJECTS 1-2 (1873); DAVID HELD ET AL, GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS: POLTICS,
ECONOMICS AND CULTURE 152 (1999).

3While federal copyright and patent statutes were enacted in the early days of the Republic, the first federal
trademark statute was not even attempted until 1870. See Trademark Act of 1870, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198. This
statute was held unconstitutional in the Trade-Mark ases, 100 U.S. 82, 99 (1879). A federal trademark act that
protected marks used in foreign commerce and in commerce with Indian tribes was established in 1881. Se Act
of Mar. 3, 1881, ch. 138, 21 Stat. 502. A federal trademark act that actually governed marks used in interstate
commerce was not achieved until 1905. Sy Act of Feb. 20, 1905, ch. 592, 33 Stat. 725.
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by Congress to craft an admittedly limited federal trademark statute,4 the
Supreme Court in the Trade-Mark Cases5 held that trademarks lacked the
necessary intellectual creativity for Congress to rest its ability to regulate
them within the purview of the so-called Intellectual Property Clause6 of the
U.S. Constitution. Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8 of the U.S. Constitution,
which provides Congress with the power to craft laws "to promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts,"7 has served as the basis for federal
power over both copyright and patents since the 1790s. Yet in 1870, the
Supreme Court, in stinging language, rejected any such basis for federal
trademark protection, stating: "The ordinary trade-mark has no necessary
relation to invention or discovery. . . . The trade-mark may be, and

generally is, the adoption of something already in existence as the distinctive
symbol of the party using it."8 The rejection of any intellectual basis for
trademark protection not only arguably slowed the development of a
comprehensive federal trademark system, 9 it placed trademarks on a
separate basis of protection, which contributed to a confusing dichotomy
that continues to restrain attempts to develop a rational regime to govern
the newly emerging trademark "uses"' 0 in today's digital environment.
The creation of the Lanham Act' in 194612 undoubtedly enhanced the
legal protection of trademarks in the United States by crafting an evolving
system of federal trademark protection that has served largely to supplant
state-law alternatives. Thus, while states continue to offer state registry
systems and maintain state trademark laws, these laws generally reflect the
legal and policy developments of the Lanham Act.' 3 For this reason, the

4 The Trademark Act of 1870 established a limited federal registration system and provided civil remedies
for the distribution of counterfeit goods. See Trademark Act of 1870 § 39.
5 Trade-Mark Casa, 100 U.S. 82.
6As a result of the Trde-Mark Case, see ifa text accompanying note 8, ofcourse, this reference to Article 1,
Section 8, Clause 8 of the U.S. Constitution as the "intellectual property clause" of the U.S. Constitution
becomes a glaring misnomer.
7
U.S. CoNsT. art. I, §8, cl. 8.
8
TradeMark Ces, 100 U.S. at 94.

See supranote 3.

o0These trademark "uses" include the use of trademarks as domain names, as metatags, as keyword buys,
and in other competitive spaces in the global market and, most particuladly, on the Internet.
" 15 U.S.C. §§1051-1127 (2006).
S'The Lanham Act was first passed by Congress onJuly 5, 1946, and signed by the President in 1947, with
an effective date of 1948.
1 See DORIS ESrELLE LONG, UNFAIR COMPEIION AND THE IANHAM ACT § 9.4 (1993). These
developments also include the incorporation of a robust federal common law that has generally allowed federal
trademark law to respond to new challenges. See gmeralyJohn Crmss, The Role ofthe States in United Stater Tradonar
Law, 49 U. LoUISVIILE L REv. 485 (2011); see also Graham Dinwoodie, The CGnman Law and TradeMarks in a
Age of Statute (Univ. of Oxford Iogal Research Paper Series, Paper No. 49/2009, 2009). Unfortunately, such
robustness seems to have faltered at the very instant that the changing landscape of the digital marketplace has
placed increasing pressure on trademarks to respond to new uses and digital challenges. See Michael Grynber,
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Lanham Act serves as a valuable tool for efforts to reboot U.S. trademark
law. In fact, such rebooting has already been attempted in certain areas,
such as in the protection of famous marks,' 4 and in providing protection
against bad-faith use of third-party trademarks as domain names for
websites,15 with inconsistent results.
The Lanham Act has proven relatively hardy in the rapidly changing
global marketplace of the latter decades of the twentieth century. It has
been amended to expand the basis for federal challenges to false or
misleading commercial activities, beyond advertising,' 6 to allow for intentto-use applications to give U.S. businesses a chance to "reserve" marks in
competition with their European counterparts, 7 to add a problematic
federal "anti-dilution" prohibition18 and to provide a basis for challenging
the unauthorized use of one party's trademark as part of another's domain
name.' 9 Yet despite this apparent continuing activity to refine U.S.
trademark law, the Lanham Act has failed to come to terms with the
continuing confusing dichotomous nature of trademark use, particularly in
7hings Are Worse than We 7ink- Tradonmklefaiesna "Formalist"Age,24 BERKELEY TECH. LJ. 897,926-27 (2009)
(contending that cunent law reflects trends toward judicial formalism and textualism). As examples of such
formalism, see Dustar Corp. v. TuAtieth Co"ey Fox Fdn Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 33-34 (2003), and Wal-Mart Stres Inc. v.
&mraBros., Ina., 529 U.S. 205, 215 (2000). For an early examination of the reemergence of election as a new
doctrine of intellectual property formalism, see Doris Estelle Long, Fr "Let's Kill All the Intellestual liope
t
Laesrs' Musags on he Deline ad Fallofthe IneflleatuealPopryEre, 34J. MARSHAlL L REV. 851 (2001). Even
in the protection of trademarks against the "harn" of "dilution," where states first led the way in crafting
statutory prohibitions against such hams, see LONG, spra, § 9.5, the Lanham Act has continued to exercise its
power. Thus, for example, in Illinois, the state antidilution statute was revised after enactment of the first federal
dilution statute in 1996 to reflect the new federal standard of"causing dilution" as the basis for relief Compare 765
ILL COMP. STAT. 1035/15 (1997) (repealed 1998) (granting a mark owner the right "to enjoin subsequent use by
another of the same or any similar mark ... if there exists a likelihood of... dilution of the distinctive quality of
the mark ... notwithstanding the absence of competition ... or of confusion as to the source of goods or
services"), with 765 ILL COMP. STAT. ANN. 1036/65 (West, Westlaw through PA 96-1496 of the 2010 Reg.
Sess.) (granting the "owner of a mark which is famous in this State" the right "to an injunction against another
person's commercial use of a mark or tradename, if the use begins after the mark has become famous and causes
dilution of the distinctive quality of the mark") (reflecting 1998 amendments). This history of change
demonstrates the powerful influence of federal authority represented by the Lanham Act and its various
amendments over the development of U.S. trademark law. It should be noted, however, that despite this strong
pull, the Illinois legislature has not yet revised its statute to reflect the changes of the 2006 Revised Federal
Trademark Dilution Act.
14 Se 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (establishing protection for "famous marks" against uses that are likely to cause
dilution).
15See id § I125(d) (establishing a cause of action against the bad faith use or registration of domain names
that are confirsingly similar to another's mark).
6 See Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, Pub. L No. 100-667, § 132, 102 Stat. 3935 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)).
" Se id § 103 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b) (2006)).
I See Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L No. 104-98, § 3, 109 Stat. 985 (1996) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §I l25(c)).
19 See Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, Tide II of the Intellectual Property and
Communications Omnibus Reform Act of 1999, Pub. L No. 106-113, §3002, 113 Stat. 1501, 1501A-545 to
548 (1999) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § I125(d)).
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This failure has led to a plethora of
today's digital environment.
inconsistent and poorly analyzed decisions governing such diverse areas as
domain names, keyword buys, parody, and noncompetitive uses of
potentially confusingly similar marks. 20 These inconsistencies not only
undermine the alleged predictability a federal statutory scheme is supposed
to provide, they are the result of a continuing and increasingly harmful
failure to come to terms with the altered nature of trademarks in the digital
era.
By ignoring the historical dichotomous nature of trademarks, as source
identifiers and information assets, Lanham Act protection remains rooted in
an ahistorical past. It is time to face the truth about the dichotomous nature
of trademarks and begin to craft legal protection regimes that not only
recognize this dichotomy, but also establish new standards for protection
that will allow trademarks to fill properly their dual roles as source
designators and information assets in the twenty-first century.
In Part II, I examine what I refer to as the historical "confusing
This confusing
dichotomy" of trademarks in Anglo-U.S. history.
dichotomy developed as a result of the dual basis on which trademarks were
originally protected-as market regulators designed to protect against
consumer confusion and as property rights of their owners who invested
time, money, and effort in creating the informational and sometimes
emotional meanings associated with such marks.
In Part III, I examine the evolution of what I contend is a new type of
While traditional trademarks
trademark-the information asset.
undoubtedly convey information about the goods and services with which
they are associated, the "information-asset mark" exists beyond the historical
source-designating role of trademarks. With a normative function based on
rights arising from an investment incentive similar to that used to prescribe
the protection of copyrights and patents, information-asset marks have
proven an uncomfortable fit within the consumer confusion focus of
traditional trademark laws.
In Part IV, I detail the scope of rights, and more critically, the limitations
to which such information-asset marks should be subject. These limitations
are not based on traditional source-designation legal fictions, such as fame,
but represent the distinct obligations and limitations of a true information-

2

For an excellent discussion ofthe some of the conflicting decisions regarding the protection of trademarks

in the new competitive spaces of the Internet, see Racuman Corp. . Geogle Inc., 562 F.3d 123, 127-30 (2d Cir.

2009).
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asset right. Consequently, the right to control the "informational" aspects of
these marks would be governed by the same normative standards for similar
information-based intellectual property rights, including fair use.
In Part V, I outline some of the challenges that the recognition of this
information-asset mark will entail. Among the challenges that must be dealt
with are the balance to be struck between investment protection and
information access, the scope of compulsory licenses, and the constitutionality
of a property right without a durational limitation.
I conclude by suggesting potential further areas for analysis required so
that trademarks can be rebooted with new normative standards that not only
reconcile its dichotomous nature, but provide a rational basis for dealing with
the new and diverse demands placed on marks in the twenty-first century.
Contrary to the present all-or-nothing battles that litter the present legal
landscape, rebooting trademarks to craft a new "information asset" mark
should help end the problematic legal fictions that have grown up, reduce the
rhetoric surrounding current debates over "digital trademarks," and
encourage the development of new modes for examining the role of
trademarks in the new competitive spaces of the Internet.
II. THE HISTORICAL "CONFUSING DICHOTOMY" OF TRADEMARKS
A. Normative Conflicts and the DigitalMarketplace
Trademarks have long suffered from a historical conflict over the
normative basis for their protection. Reduced to its most fundamental level,
this conflict arises from a basic dispute over whose interests should take
precedence when the interests of consumers and trademark owners do not
coincide. This fundamental normative issue lies at the heart of most of the
debates regarding trademark protection in the competitive spaces of the
Internet. The question of the type of right that lies at the heart of
trademark protection-property right 2' or market regulatory/unfair
competition right 22-is a corollary to the fundamental normative question
of whose interests are paramount in a trademark dispute. If the goal is to
protect consumer reliance on the informational value of a mark in making

2S *

eg.,

Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 93 (1879) (describing trademark protection as a "prmperty

right").
22 S ag., Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 412-13 (1916) (describing trademark
protection as "but a part of the broader law of unfair competition" (citing Elgin Nat. Watch Co. v. Il. Watch
Case Co., 179 U.S. 665, 674 (1901), abnatllyHurn v. Ousler, 289 U.S. 238 (1933); G. & C. Meniam Co. v.
Saalfield, 198 F. 369,372 (6th Cir. 1912); Cohen v. Nagle, 76 N.E. 276 (Mass. 1906))).
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critical market choices, then one set of rights are needed to protect such
informational value. By contrast, if the goal is to protect the trademark
owner's investment in its mark, then another set of rights are implicated that
focus on the protection of the owner's investment in his mark.
The clearest example of these conflicting interests lies in the traditional
problem of the ability of a trademark owner to prohibit the unauthorized
use of its mark on a noncompetitive good or service. Assume that Long
Motors decides to create and market a new sports car under the trademark
"Coca-Cola." It does not obtain permission from the holders of the CocaCola mark for beverages to use the mark in question. In the inevitable
lawsuit, if the goal of protection is the consumer and the informational value
of trademarks for that consumer, the use of Coca-Cola as a mark for cars
might be allowed if the competitive nexus is not sufficient to cause
misinformation about the source or quality of the cars. The actual outcome
of such a dispute would depend on a number of factors that might affect the
source confusion arising from the use in question, including associational
confusion. 23 But the normative focus would be on the role of the trademark
as a conveyor of information about the source of the car and its qualities or
characteristics. 24
By contrast, if the goal of protection is the trademark owner's interests
in protecting its investment, then Coca-Cola cars may well be held to violate
the beverage mark owner's rights, even in the absence of any likely
confusion. To the contrary, to the extent that the unauthorized use of the
Coca-Cola mark diminishes the investment value of the Coca-Cola mark to
its prior user, including harming its uniqueness in the marketplace, such use
would be prohibited regardless of whether or not consumer confusion arises.
The normative focus is on the investment value of the mark as a business
asset. 25
As a practical matter, in any given case the normative basis for reliefconsumer or investment value protection-might not necessarily be

23 Lkely confusion prohibitions under the Lanham Act are not limited to source or origin confusion but
include associational confusion as well. S* eg., 15 U.S.C. § I125(aXIXA) (2006) (providing relief against the
unauthorized use of mark which is "likely to cause confusion ... as to the affiliation, connection, or association of
such person with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods or services ...
by another").
4
Tese qualities could include emotive messages about the lifestyle choices that ownership of such a good
represents. Se Doris Estelle Long, Is Fame All Tere Is? Beakng Global Monopolist at Their Oun Markeing Game, 40
GEO. WASH. INr'L L REV. 123 (2008) (describing the role of emotional advertising in the development ofbrand
identities and the potential irrational impact such emotional advertising may have on purchaser decision-making).
5
2 This basis for protection is most often found in the relatively newer doctrines informing dilution and
famous mark protection. Se discussion ina Part I.C.
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outcome determinative. The strong reputation of the Coca-Cola beverage
mark might lead courts to find that consumers could be confused about the
association between the two marks despite the lack of a strong competitive
nexus. 26 Alternatively, courts might find that the value of the mark was
harmed by the car company's unauthorized free riding on Coca-Cola's
reputation for quality goods. In the hard-goods world, resolving the
normative basis for protection might not necessarily result in greater
predictability. But when conflicts between consumers and mark owners
move into the digital realm, differing normative bases result in markedly
different outcomes. For example, if the car company had used the mark
Coca-Cola as a keyword to attract visitors to its web page about its new
Coca-Cola marked cars, the normative basis that focuses on consumer
protection might have found no such confusion since the keyword provided
truthfil information about the webpage to which the consumer was being
directed.27 By contrast, if the protection of the mark owner's investment is
paramount, then such uses might be considered a commercial use that
28
harms the value of this investment.
This simple dichotomy, however, is not reflective of the present state of
trademark protection on the Internet. To the contrary, in order to deal
with the evolving nature of use of trademarks in the competitive spaces of
the Internet, courts have focused on an ever-changing battery of tests.
From early considerations of initial-interest confusion29 and per se
dilution,30 to concerns over the meaning of "use in commerce" 3' and the
development of new doctrines of cybersquatting,32 courts continue to craft a
staggering array of evolving theories of protection that has left
commentators and scholars breathless at the multiplicity of reasoning. The
frustration that has arisen from such a diversity of approaches may be most
clearly demonstrated by the recent decision of the Second Circuit in
Rescuecom Corp. v. Google Inc.33 to attach an appendix detailing the complex

26S; eg., Quality Inns Int'l, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 695 F. Supp. 198, 220 (D. Md. 1988) (finding a
likelihood of confusion with the "Mc" mark used by plaintiff for its fast food McDonald's restaurants and
defendant's McSleep motels).
21 S &g., Bihari v. Gross, 119 F. Supp. 2d 309, 323 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (finding use of a metatag that
reproduced plaintiffs mark was permissible because it merely served "as a cataloging system for a search engine"
and described the contents of the web page).
2
Cf Promatek Indus., LAd. v. Equitrac Corp., 300 F.3d 808 (7th Cir. 2002) (enjoining competitor's use of
trademark as metatag).
2 S*; eg., Brookfield Commc'ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1063 (9th Cir. 1999).
so S eg., Vrtual Works, Inc. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 106 F. Supp. 2d 845, 847-48 (RD. Va. 2000).
3' S, eg., 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 414 F.3d 400, 406-07 (2d Cir. 2005).
32Se 15 U.S.C. § II 25(d) (2006).
3 Rescuecom Corp. v. Google Inc., 562 F.3d 123, 131 (2d Cir. 2009); se also Merck & Co. v. Mediplan
Health Consulting, Inc., 431 F. Supp. 2d 425 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); Ford Motor Co. v. Greatdomains.com, Inc., 177
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issues arising from the "use in commerce" fiction that has roiled courts
attempting to deal with the extension of trademark rights into the digital
realm.34
The extension of intellectual property rights to new media is often
fraught with inconsistent determinations, as courts struggle to apply laws
created for one media to another. Such struggles have often been amplified
when new technologies are involved. Thus, both copyright and patent
regimes were buffeted by the problem of the scope of protection to be
granted software under their respective regimes, an issue that remains
problematic to this day.35 Yet the difficulties of crafting a rational basis for
the extension of trademark rights into such new competitive spaces of the
Internet-as domain names, URLs, and search-engine results-go beyond
the struggle to adapt intellectual property laws to new communication
technologies. Such struggles manifest a deeper problem for trademark
regimes in the twenty-first century. That deeper problem is the historical
confusing dichotomy in the normative basis for trademark protection and
the reluctance or inability of courts and legislatures to deal with such
dichotomy in a rational manner.
B. Market Regulation and Consumer Confitsion
Back in the "early days," when trademarks were perceived as simple
identifiers of the maker or distributor of a particular good or service, 36
trademark protection appeared to form part of a growing legal regime
designed to regulate the market. This regime was rooted in increasing
efforts to define and regulate competition in the marketplace by establishing
the boundaries of fair conduct.37 Scholars continue to debate whether it
F. Supp. 2d 635 (E.D. Mich. 2001).
3 SeRescuRaom Corp., 562 F.3d at 131-41.
Cmpare
nn
AT&T Corp. v. Excel Commc'ns, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352, 1357-58 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
(finding programs patentable that achieve a "useful, concrete, and tangible result"), with In re Benson,
441 F.2d 682, 684, 688 (C.C.P.A. 1971) (an early patent case analyzing the Patent Board's rejection of
the extension of patent protection to a software program); compare Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai,
Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 706 (2d Cir. 1992) (utilizing a more refined abstract, filtration, and comparison test
to determine the scope of copyright protection in computer software programs), with Whelan Assocs.,
Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1233, 1236 (3d Cir. 1986) (applying a "look and feel"
test to determine copyright infringement of computer programs). For a good historical analysis of
Supreme Court jurisprudence involving the patentability of software programs and the ongoing
difficulties in determining the scope of protection for such programs under U.S. patent law, see Bilski v.
Kapos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225-31 (2010).
36 Trademarks, or at least source identifiers, date from at least the international trading days of
Mesopotamia. See HELD ET AL, supra note 2, at 152; see also BROWNE, supra note 2, at 1-2; ScHECHTER, .spra
note 2, at 20.
3 See Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 412-13 (1916) ("The essence of the wrong
consists in the sale of the goods of one manufacturer or vendor for those of another. ... This essential element is
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was the protection of the consumer38 or the mark holder (producer)39 that
lay behind the early development of trademark protection. There is no
question that courts frequently failed to indicate clearly the basis on which
protection was granted. For example, in Amoskeag Manufacturing Co. v.
Spear,40 an early state trademark case in the United States, the court
described the following reasons for granting protection to plaintiff's
trademark:
When we consider the nature of the wrong that is committed when the
right of property in a trade mark is invaded .... He who affixes to his own
goods an imitation of an original trade mark, by which those of another
are distinguished and known, seeks, by deceiving the public, to divert and
appropriate to his own use, the profits to which the superior skill and
enterprise of the other had given him a prior and exclusive title. He
endeavors by a false representation, to effect a dishonest purpose; he
commits a fraud upon the public, and upon the true owner of the trade
mark. The purchaser has imposed upon him an article that he never meant to buy,
and the owner is robbed of thefmits of the reputation that he had successfully

labored to earn. 4 '

While language regarding the dichotomous goals of trademark
protection continues to appear, the general normative standards that
the same in trademad cases as in cases of unfair competition unaccompanied with trademark infingement. In
fact, the common law of trademarks is but a part of the broader law of unfair competition." (citations omitted)
(citing Elgin Nat. Watch Co. v. Il. Watch Case Co., 179 U.S. 665, 674 (1901), abrogatad y Hum v. Ouster, 289
U.S. 238 (1933); G. & C. Merriam Co. v. Saalfeld, 198 F. 369, 372 (6th Cir. 1912); Cohen v. Nagle, 76 N.E. 276
(Mass. 1906))); G. & C Memam Co., 198 F. at 372 ('The entire substantive law of trade-marks. .. is a branch of
the broader law of unfair competition. The ultimate offense always is that defendant has passed off his goods as
and for those of the complainant." (citing Elgin Nat Watch Co., 179 U.S. at 674; Capewell Horse Nail Co. v.
Mooney, 172 Fed. 826 (2d Cir. 1909))); Oliver R. Mitchell, Unfair Competition, 10 HARV. L REV. 275,275 (1896)
("Logically speaking, the faict is that Unfair Competition is properly a generic title, of which trade mark is a
specific division."); see also Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 428 (2003) ('Traditional trademark
infringement law is part of the broader law of unfair competition. . .that has its sources in English common law."
(citation omitted)).

3 See Nicholas S. Economides, 77TeFcwomics of Tradnarks, 78 TRADEMARK REP. 523, 525-27 (1988)
(suggesting that trademarks primarily exist to enhance consumer decisions and to create incentives for firms to
produce desirable products); Mark A. Lemley, The Modon Lanham Act andthehath ofCommon Some, 108 YALE L.
1687, 1695-96 (1999) (stating that the single purpose oftrademark law is "to enable the public to identify easily a
particular product from a particular source").
39 Se Mark P. McKenna, The.Noma&e Foundatiansof Tradenmak Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L REV. 1839, 1848
(2007) (describing 'traditional' American trademark law" as "unapologetically producer-oiented"); Adam
Mossoff What is hopert? Ibiing the Pfer Back Tgethe, 45 ARIZ. L REV. 371, 419-22 (2003) (describing eady
trademark cases as defining the property entitlements of businessmen whose use of certain marks created a
valuable property interest to be protected); Keith M. Stolte, How Earv DdAngl-Amoican TradenarkLaw BginAn
Anguw to &haker'sCommd=n, 8 FORDHAM INTEL PROP. MEDIA & ENT. LJ. 505,541-43 (1998) (analyzing the
interplay of the commercial rise of the merchant-adventurers with the demands of protection of the trade value
ofcertain marks in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries with the diminishing role of the guilds in regulating the
use of marks in England).
40
Amoskeag Mfg. Co. v. Spear, 2 Sand. 599 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1849).
41
Id at 605-6 (emphasis added).
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evolved for protecting trademarks in its earliest days appears most firmly
rooted in the evolving unfair competition and market regulation (trade
protection) regimes. 42 This does not mean that language regarding the
property nature of the right to be protected under trademark law was not
also prevalent in early court decisions. To the contrary, as demonstrated by
Amoskeag Manufacturing Co.,43 language regarding the property nature of the
right to be protected appeared with increasing frequency in early cases.4
But despite frequent reference to the property nature of trademarks in these
early cases,4 5 the method of relief that evolved for protecting trademarks
utilized an analytical framework that gave precedence to public (consumer)
interests. 46
In both patent and copyright regimes, analytical frameworks for
determining whether a particular act violates an owner's rights follow the
Courts determine the existence of the
same general methodology.
intellectual property right in question, its "ownership"4 7 by the party seeking
relief, and whether the defendant has used the intellectual property in a
manner which is inconsistent with the owner's exclusive rights. While the
rights of an owner under U.S. copyright law are expressed in terms of
positive rights "to do and to authorize" others to use the work in specific
ways,48 and patent rights are expressed in negative terms as rights to
prohibit specified uses, 49 under both regimes the violation of rights is

42 Sf; e.g., Frank . Schechter, The Rational Bais of Tradmark lhotection, 40 HARV. L REV. 813, 830-31
(1927); se also Mossoff, supra note 39, at 423 (describing the transformation of trademark law into a "derivative
form ofcommerial and trade law doctrine").
4
Amaskeg Mfg. Co., 2 Sand. at 607-08.
4Se e.g.,Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 92 (1879) ('The right to adopt and use a symbol or a device to
distinguish the goods or property made or sold by the person whose mark it is, to the exclusion of use by all other
persons, has been long recognized by the common law and the chancery courts of England and of this county,
and by the statutes of some of the States. It is apropery rght for the violation ofwhich damages may be recovered
in an action at law, and the continued violation of it will be enjoined by a court of equity, with compensation for
past infringement." (emphasis added)).
45
See infa Part II.C. (discussing the development of a normative basis for trademark protection based on the
property rights of trademark owners under early U.K and U.S. law).
4 See, e.g., Stahly, Inc. v. M.H. Jacobs Co., 183 F.2d 914, 917 (7th Cir. 1950) ("It must be
remembered that the trade-mark laws and the law of unfair competition are concerned not alone with
the protection of a property right existing in an individual, but also with the protection of the public
from fraud and deceit, and it is obvious that the right of the public to be so protected is a right which
transcends the rights of the individual trade-mark owner and is beyond his power to waive." (citations
omitted)).
4 Such "ownership" includes the holder ofbeneficial rights in the work at issue, including licensees. S*; eg.,
17 U.S.C. §501(b) (2006) (granting legal or beneficial owners of copyright the right to seek relief for infringement
of their rights).
a Se 17 U.S.C. §106 (2006) (granting authors exclusive rights "to do and to authorize" specific actions with
regard to their works).
4 Se 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2006) (prohibiting others from undertaking certain acts in connection with a
patented invention "without authority" of the patent owner).
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determined simply by examining whether the defendant's use violated this
right.50 Public-interest concerns may appear in individual cases in the form
of fair use considerations, 51or in determinations regarding the availability of
injunctive relief,52 but such considerations do not form part of the initial
analytical framework in determining whether a violation has occurred. The
specific interjection of the public interest within the rights framework occurs
either as a defense in the case of fair use,53 or at the remedies stage. By
contrast, public-interest concerns in trademark cases have become the
critical analytical linchpin in the rights framework.
Under U.S. trademark law, the analytical framework for traditional54
trademark violations is couched in terms of whether a likelihood of conftision
exists among consumers regarding the two marks at issue.55 This test has

50 For example, in order to establish copyright infringement a copyright holder must simply establish
ownership of a copyrighted work and unauthorized acts in connection with this work S*eeg., Feist Publ'ns, Inc.
v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991); Amstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946).
Similaly, to establish patent infringement a patent holder must establish ownership ofa patentable invention and
unauthorized uses of that invention. S& eg., Mankman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 374 (1996);
Johnson &Johnston Assocs., Inc. v. R.E. Serv. Co., No. C 97-4382 CRB, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13142, at *4-6
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 1998).
5'S&, 17 U.S.C. §107 (2006).
52 Se Ebay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006) (stressing the equitable nature of
decisions regarding the imposition of injunctive relief in case ofpatent infringement).
53 See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 561 (1985); Latimer v. Roaring
Toyz, Inc., 601 F.3d 1224,1239 (1lth Cir. 2010).
m I am using the term "traditional" to refer to the historical tests for trademark infringement These
traditional tests do not include protection against the dilution of a mark's distinctiveness. Although the theory of
protecting trademarks from potential dilution of their distinctive quality in the United States was allegedly first
posited by Frank Schechter in 1927 in his seminal article The RatidalBasis of Tradnark Prtion,it should be
noted that his theory of protection was designed to give adequate protection to "arbitrary, coined or fanciful
marks" where such marks were used on goods or services with no competitive nexus. Se Schechter, supra note 42,
at 828. Although Schechter states "[t]his entirely arbitrary symbol would soon lose its arresting uniqueness and
hence its selling power if it could also be used on pianos, shaving cream, and fountain pens," id. at 830, language
which seems to presage the distinctiveness protection granted such marks under federal dilution doctrines, see 15
U.S.C. § Il25(c) (2006), such distinctiveness concens are raised in the context of a likely-confusion doctrine,
which at that time did not provide protection against unauthorized uses on noncompeting goods. See Act of Feb.
20, 1905, ch. 592, § 16, 15 U.S.C. §96 (repealed 1946) (limiting protection of federally registered trademarks to
the unauthorized uses on "merchandise of substantially the same descriptive properties as those set forth in the
registration"); see also Borden Ice Cream Co. v. Borden's Condensed Milk Co., 201 F. 510, 515 (7th Cir. 1912)
(finding insufficient similarity between condensed milk and ice cream to warrant reliel); c Robert G. Bone,
&hahter'sIdes in HistmicalContel and Diluion'sRochy Road 24 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER AND HIGH TECH. LJ.
469, 477-83 (2008) (detailing the historical battles for the acceptance of dilution). Dilution protection was not
adopted until 1947 by the states and until 1996 by federal statute. See discussion ifoa Part H.C. (regarding
development ofU.S. dilution protection).
55Se, e.g., McLean v. Fleming, 96 U.S. 245, 251 (1877) ("What degree of resemblance is necessary
to constitute an infringement is incapable of exact definition, as applicable to all cases. All that courts of
justice can do, in that regard, is to say that no trader can adopt a trade-mark, so resembling that of
another trader, as that ordinary purchasers, buying with ordinary caution, are lrely to be misled." (emphasis
added)). See generally 15 U.S.C. §§11 14(1)(a)-(b), 1125(a)(1)(A) (2006) (prohibiting the use of marks "likely
to cause confusion" with registered and unregistered marks, respectively). The test for likelihood of
confusion varies from circuit to circuit regarding the precise factors to be considered (or more precisely,
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become so well entrenched in trademark rights analysis that it has become
the international standard for determining the scope of such rights. For
example, Article 16 of the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)-still the most significant international
intellectual property treaty governing trademarks today56-- unequivocally
requires Member Countries to grant trademark protection where the
challenged unauthorized use would result in a "likelihood of confision."57
Likely confusion is not the only basis on which relief must be granted under
TRIPS. To the contrary, and in accordance with the dichotomous nature
of trademarks as both unfair-competition regulators and manifestations of
exclusive property rights, Article 16 of TRIPS also requires the protection of
well-known marks in certain situations "provided that the interests of the
owner of the registered trademark are likely to be damaged by such use.""
But the test of likely confusion is so firmly established in international regimes
that TRIPS establishes a mandatory presumption of relief in the event of the
use of identical marks on identical goods.59 This interposition of consumerprotection concerns between the trademark owner's intellectual property
and his ability to prevent its unauthorized use is distinctly different from the
rights framework for the protection of patents and copyrights.
The normative focus on the protection of the meaning of a trademark
to the consuming public places the protection of the source-designating
Such information
function at the heart of trademark protection.
play in
trademarks
that
critical
roles
most
of
the
signification remains one
6
0
While the nature of the information that mark
the global economy.
how such factors are delineated). See LONG, supra note 13, §§ 2.4-2.5; 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY,
MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 24:30 (4th ed. 2010) ("[E]ach of the 13
federal circuit courts of appeal has developed its own version of the list and each appears to be jealous of
its own formulation of factors."); Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests for Trademark
Inflingement, 96 CAL. L. REv. 1581, 1582-83 (2006) (describing the various factors applied by the
different circuits). Nevertheless, each circuit focuses on the likely confusion of the ordinary consumer
arising from the uses in question. See Beebe, supra, at 1582. Furthermore, such confusion is not limited
to technical source confusion, what has often been referred to as "classic confusion," but includes
associational confusion as well. See Bone, supra note 54, at 472.
56
Despite the harsh criticism that has often been directed toward the TRIPS Agreement, it remains the
basis for at least the begimng of any discussion regarding the scope of protection for covered intellectual property
rights, such as trademarks, due to both the depth ofits coverage as well as theflact that over 150 countries to date
have agreed to be bound by its provisions.
5 S TRIPS, supra note 1,art. 16(1) (emphasis added).
so Id art. 16(3); see also Council Directive 2008/95, art. 5(2), 2008 OJ. (L 299) 25, 29 (EC) (providing
for the protection of marks vith "a reputation" where the unauthorized use of such mark "takes unfair
advantage of, or is detrimental to, the distinctive character or the repute of the trade mari").
5 Se TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 16(1) ("In case of the use of an identical sign for identical goods or
services, a likelihood of confusion shall be presumed.").
6oSee, e.g., Long, supra note 24, at 137. In fact in the latter decades of the twentieth century, this
information-signification role took on new normative meaning as the information value of marks served
as the basis of presumed cost efficiencies which supported an arguably different theoretical basis for
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owners may seek to imbed in a given brand has expanded beyond simple
source signification, 6 1the protection of consumers' ability to rely upon such
information signification remains at the core of domestic (and international)
trademark protection.
The interposition of the public interest in the initial infringement
analysis also underscores the close relationship between trademark rights
and market regulation. Unlike patents and copyrights, which are protected
to "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,"62 trademarks are
protected in the interest of preventing competitive hann. This harm in turn is
measured by its impact on the consumer. This does not mean that competitor
concerns do not play a role in the determination of what symbols qualify for
protection as trademarks. To the contrary, considerations of genericness 63
and functionality64 are premised in part on a competitor's need for access to
trademark protection-that of economic efficiency. See Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Trademarks
and Consurner Search Costs on the Internet, 41 HOUS. L. REv. 777, 778 (2004) (arguing that the historical goal
of trademark law was to "foster the flow of information in markets," reducing consumer search costs);
William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. & EcoN. 265,
265-66 (1987) ("Our overall conclusion is that trademark law, like tort law in general (trademark law is
part of the branch of tort law known as unfair competition), can best be explained on the hypothesis that
the law is trying to promote economic efficiency."). But see Chad J. Doellinger, A New Theory of Trademarks,
111 PENN. ST. L. REv. 823, 835 (2007) ("The central problem with the economic theory is that it has
become normative, and, in the process, has jettisoned trademark philosophy from its true normative
underpinning."); McKenna, supra note 39, at 1840-41 ("[Trademark law was not traditionally intended
to protect consumers. Instead, trademark law, like all unfair competition law, sought to protect
producers from illegitimate diversions of their trade by competitors.").
61From simple information about the quality of the good based on its source to emotional images about
brand lifestyles meanings with which marks are embedded, the types of information that trademark owners may
embed have varied, but not their fisndamental information signifying function. See Lng, supra note 24, at 134-35
(describing the development ofbranding, including the increasing emphasis on emotional meanings embedded in
famous marks).
62U.S. CONST. art. I, §8, cl. 8.
65
A generic term is defined as "one that refers, or has come to be understood as refening, to the genus of
which the particular product is a species." Abercrombie & Ftch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d
Cir. 1976). Such terms lack distinctiveness and cannot serve as a protectable trademark under the Lanham Act
regardless of the term ofuse or advertising expenditures made by the putative owner to secure such rights. See 15
U.S.C. § 1064(3) (2006) (providing for cancellation of registered mark "[a]t any time if the registered mark
becomes the generic name for the goods or services, or a portion thereof, for which it is registered"). The ultimate
impact of a determination ofgenericness is to fire the term in question for use by competitors. Sty A.J. Canfield
Co. v. Honickman, 808 F.2d 291, 304 (3d Cir. 1986) ("Underlying the geneiicness doctrine is the principle that
some terms so directly signify the nature of the product that interests ofcompetition demand that other producers
be able to use them even if terms have or might become identified with a source and so acquire 'de facto'
secondary meaning. Courts refuse to protect a generic term because competitors need it more to describe their
goods than the claimed mark holder needs it to distinguish its goods from others." (citation omitted)).
6 Functionality concerns are raised under the lanham Act in connection with the protection of "devices"
as trademarks, including product configurations, color, and container packaging. Similar to genesieness concerns
for word and symbol marks, functionality is concerned with avoiding the grant of trademark rights to shapes,
packaging and other devices which competitors may need to use. Echoing earlier decisions regarding
genericness, the Supreme Court defined a functional feature as one that is 'essential to the use or purpose of the
article or if it affects the cost or quality of the article,' that is,if exclusive use ofthe feature would put competitors
at a significant non-reputation-related disadvantage." Qualitex Co. v.Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 255
(1995) (quoting Inwood [abs., Inc. v, Ives Labs., 456 U.S. 844,850 n.10 (1982)).
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the terms and shapes in question. But while competitor needs may shape
some of the issues surrounding the existence of a viable trademark right, it is
consumer needs that determine the ultimate scope such rights will be
granted.
Under such a normative framework, protection of the investment value
of a mark owner's brand would have little, if any, significance. 65 Thus, for
example, the renown of a mark would be relevant in a likelihood-ofconfusion analysis,66 but would have no separate normative or analytical
function beyond such confusion. Protection of marks against dilution or
other harms that do not directly affect the informational value of the mark
with regard to the goods or services at issue do not fall within this normative
framework.67 Yet the early history of trademarks demonstrates that such
clear normative goals were not always articulated or even followed. To the
contrary, in the face of growing efforts by the courts to "propertize"
trademarks,68 this single normative (and relatively predictable) framework
descended into the confusion that continues to plague the rational
development of a trademark regime that meets the challenges of the digital
marketplace of the twenty-first century.
C. The Evolving Nature of "Propertized" Trademarks
At the same time that norms for the protection of trademarks appear
firmly rooted within the arena of market regulation and consumer
protection, the dichotomous nature of trademarks also places them firmly
within a normative framework based on the protection of the property

65 This lack of focus on a return on investment to encourage the creation of new marks further underscores
the distinctions between patent, copyright, and trademarks. By rejecting the creativity basis for trademark
protection as a basis for federal trademark regulation, the Supreme Court in the Trade-Mark Gses, 100 U.S. 82,
99 (1879), underscores that providing an economic return in exchange for the creation of new brands is not at the
heart of U.S. trademark law. While the protection of such investment has been used to support other types of
causes of action in connection with trademarks, including antidilution statutes, see 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2006),
these types of relief reflect a different normative standard. See discussion inoa Part II.C.
6 Such renown is captured by the fiactor of likely confusion that considers the strngth of the marik S*eeg.,
Quality Inns Int'l, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 695 F. Supp. 198, 216-20 (1988). See gonally sources cited supra
note 55.
67 Tamishment, however, would remain a viable claim to the extent that such tarnishment harms the
informational value of the mark's significance to the consumer. While facially dilution (by blurting) might
similarly be directed toward protecting the informational value of a trademark for the consumer, the doctrinal
rejection of any role for consumer confusion in dilution analysis plainly demonstrates that the purpose behind
such protection has no relationship to the information value of the mark for consumers. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)
(providing that dilution is considered "regardless of the presence or absence of actual or likely confusion, of
competition, or of actual economic injury").
68
See discussion infa Part H.C.
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interest of the owners.69 In Millington v. Fox, 70 one of the earliest reported
trademark cases arising from the Industrial Revolution, when global trade
became even more strongly focused on consumer goods as the source of
economic growth,"1 the English court in dicta indicated that marks were a
form of property and granted injunctive relief against the unauthorized use
of plaintiffs mark even if no fraudulent intent in adopting the mark was
evident.72 This concept of a mark as a form of property was continually
reiterated in early U.K. and U.S. trademark cases,73 reaching one of its
clearest articulations under U.S. law by the Supreme Court in 1879 in the
Trade-Mark Cases where the court stated (also in dicta):
The right to adopt and use a symbol or a device to distinguish the
goods or property made or sold by the person whose mark it is, to the
exclusion of use by all other persons, has been long recognized by the

65 There are countless definitions of "property" and raging debates over the nature of a property right,
including the critical questions of whether property rights are bundles of rights or simply represent a single
exclusive right to be enjoyed by the property holder. ConareJ.E. Penner, The "Bwdle oflihts" Irlare oflPoperty,
43 UCLA L REV. 711 (1996) (discussing and criticizing the bundle theory), uith Thomas W. Merrill, Itmpery and
the Rht To Ewclude, 77 NEB. L REV. 730, 730 (1998) ("[The right to exclude others is more than just 'one of the
most essential' constituents of property-it is the sine qua non."). For purposes of this discussion, I am using the
narrow definition of "property" rights as the right to exclude others from the use or enjoyment of a given
property. I have selected this definition because it sets up the easiest dichotomy between trademarks, whose
boundaries of protection have historically included considerations of consumer confusion and other trade
regulation concerns, see discussionsupra Part II.B., and copyrights and patents, whose boundaries at least in the
initial-liability phases have not been similarly constrained. For example, under U.S. copyright law, protection is
granted when a work is substantially similar to another's. S*; eg., Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods. Inc. v.
McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977) (granting rights based on substantial similarity between
plaintiffs characters in children's television shows and certain characters used to advertise defendant's fast food).
The question of public interest is not raised, except in the nature of the remedies being sought or in the defenses
raised to a challenged infringement, such as under fair use doctrines. See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying
text. Unlike trademarks, the initial determination of potential infringement is made separate from any
consideration of public harm. I offer no opinion in this Article as to which of the many competing theories of
"property rights" may be correct for purposes of analyzing intellectual property cases generally, or trademark
cases specifically.
7oMillington v. Fox, (1838) 40 Eng. Rep. 956 (Ch.).
The role of trademarks as potential competitive levers skyrocketed in the days of the Industrial
Revolution when, for the first time in industrial history, advances in technology resulted in increased
consumer income that triggered a demand for consumer goods that has yet to diminish. See, e.g., PAUL
KENNEDY, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE GREAT POWERS: ECONOMIC CHANGE AND MILITARY
CONFLICT FROM 1500 To 2000, 146 (1987); DAVID S. LANDES, THE UNBOUND PROMETHEUS:

TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGES AND INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT IN WESTERN EUROPE FROM 1750 TO

THE PRESENT 41 (2d ed. 2003).
n Se MilZgton, 40 Eng. Rep. at 962-64; see also Robert P. Merges, One Huded rs of So&ude hitellAia
Properay Ia, 1900-2000, 88 CAL L REV. 2187, 2208 n.92 (2000) (describing the property dicta ofMilingtnm and
its impact on US trademark law); Cesar Ramirez-Montes, A Re-Evmnnation of the Ongind Fundaions ofATgoAneican TradnarkLaw, 14 MARQ. 1NrEL PROP. L REV 91, 109-10 (2010) (discussing the impact of ilkgton
on the treatment of trademarks as property).
SSee McKenna, supra note 39, at 1848 (describing "'traditional' American trademark law" as
"unapologetically producer-oriented"); Mossoff, supra note 39, at 419-22 (2003) (describing early trademark cases
as defining the property entitlements of businessmen whose use of certain marks created a valuable property
interest to be protected).
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common law and the chancery courts of England and of this country, and
by the statutes of some of the States. It is a property rght for the violation of
which damages may be recovered in an action at law, and the continued
violation of it will be enjoined by a court of equity, with compensation for
past infringement.74
The language regarding the nature of trademarks as a "property" based
right has been a constant in both national and international debates over
the role of trademarks and shows no sign of disappearing. In fact, the
perceived nature of trademarks as property led to increasing criticism in the
last decade of the twentieth century.75 This "propertization" was most
readily apparent in the extension of trademark rights to domain name
disputes under the Anti-Cybersquatting Protection Act76 and in the creation
of a federal dilution cause of action under the Lanham Act.7 7 A normative
framework based on property rights establishes a different rights framework
for trademark protection, one which not only values different goals but
which also alters the outcome of trademark disputes. This framework
places the interests of the trademark holder in protecting his investment in
creating a viable brand in the marketplace above or at least in
contradistinction to a normative framework that considers consumer
protection as the lodestone for analysis. Thus, for example, in the CocaCola cars example, under a property rights framework there is no question
that the junior user will be obligated to cease use of the mark even if no
confusion arises or is even likely to arise from such use. In fact, the issue of
whether confusion would be likely to arise is irrelevant. Instead, priority of
78
rights becomes the critical factor.

" Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 92 (1879) (emphasis added); se also Col. Say. Bank v. Ha. Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666,673 (1999) ("The Lanham Act may well contain provisions that
protect constitutionally cognizable property interests"); Scandinavia Belting Co. v. Asbestos & Rubber Works of
Am., Inc., 257 F. 937, 941 (2d Cir. 1919) ("The right of prperty in trade-marks has come to be recognized as of
note 39, at 420.
immense and incalculable value."); McKenna, wpra note 39, at 1860; Mossoff supM
75 Such criticism even advocated a reconceptualization of trademark law that would severely reduce the
ability of mark owners to challenge even potentially competitive unauthorized uses. Sa ag., Imnley, ssmr note 38,
at 1687; Glynn S. Lumney,Jr., The Tradnok Monupokies, 48 EMORY LJ. 367, 419 (1999); se alsoJessica litman,
Brakastwith Bahnas The FAbb Interest in the A&riigAge, 108 YALE LJ. 17 17 (1999).
76Se 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2006) (establishing relief under U.S. law for bad-faith use or registration of
domain name).
" Se id § I125(c) (establishing relief under U.S. law for unauthorized uses likely to cause dilution by
blurring
or dilution by tamishment of [a] famous mark").
'8 Taken to the extreme, such property rights analysis could rapidly result in a partitioning of available
commercial symbols that leaves few choices to newcomers. Alternatively, however, such a parsing could force
marketers into the creation of more coined and fanciful marks, encouraging creativity in the same manner as
copyright protection for expressive works.
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Despite the constant refrain of the need to protect the property value of
mark holders from misappropriation by courts,79 trademark protection that
seeks to protect the information value of a mark in connection with
consumer purchasing decisions, even when couched in terms of
misappropriation of producer rights, does not actually place such producer
rights above those of the consumer. For example, the Court in Mishawaka
Rubber & Woolen Manufacturing Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co.,80 in oft cited language,
discussed its decision to protect the plaintiffs trademark in terms of
protecting the "commercial magnetism" the plaintiff had developed in its
mark, stating:
The protection of trade-marks is the law's recognition of the
psychological function of symbols.... A trade-mark is a merchandising
short-cut which induces a purchaser to select what he wants, or what he
has been led to believe he wants. . . . Whatever the means employed, the
aim is the same-to convey through the mark, in the minds of potential
customers, the desirability of the commodity upon which it appears. Once
this is attained, the trade-mark owner has something of value. If another
poaches upon the commercial magnetism of the symbol he has created,
the owner can obtain legal redress. 8'
On its face this language appears to support the protection of the plaintiffs
mark based on the commercial value the plaintiff has created in it. Yet the
emphasis by the Court on the "psychological function" of such commercial
property is buttressed by the property's utility as a "merchandising shortcut" used "to convey through the mark . . . the desirability of the commodity
upon which it appears."8 2 While such psychological function may not
convey information about the quality of the product itself, it is nevertheless
information upon which the consumer relies in making purchasing
decisions.83
By contrast, when trademark protection attaches in the absence of likely
consumer confusion, as in the case of dilution,84 a different normative basis

9
*S&; g., Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203,205 (1942) (discussing
value ofbrand recognition to trademark owners). This brand-recognition value lies at the heart of the trademark
owners' expanding attempts to leverage trademark reputation achieved in one market into other, often unrelated
markets. Segmeraly Long, mpra note 24, at 134-36.
80Muhauzt Rubber & Wom Mf. C., 316 U.S. 203.
81 Id at 205.
82 S id (emphasis added).
8 See Long, .supranote 24, at 134 (discussing role of emotive advertising in brand extensions and rationality
of consumer choices based on such advertising).
8 Sw discussion infra text accompanying notes 85-98 (discussing the development ofthe dilution doctrine in
U.S. law and the role of likely confusion in such development).

HeinOnline -- 49 U. Louisville L. Rev. 535 2010-2011

536

UNIVERSTY OFLOUISVILLE LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 49:517

for relief has been crafted. Such new basis cannot be easily placed within a
trademark regime that has placed investment interests below those of
consumer protection and market regulation. I do not mean to suggest that
efforts to protect the investment value of a mark do not warrant legal
protection. But where such efforts are not supported by consumerprotection interests, they represent a distinctly different normative
paradigm. Failure to acknowledge this difference and to craft rights, and
limitations, based on this difference results in the confusing dichotomy that
continues to bedevil ongoing efforts to extend rational trademark protection
to the digital marketplace. These problems are most clearly demonstrated
in the difficult history of dilution protection in the United States.
The theory of protecting trademarks from potential dilution of their
distinctive quality in the United States was arguably first posited by Frank
Schechter in 1927 in his seminal article The Rational Basis of Trademark

Protection.85 In this article, Schechter urged protection of the "uniqueness"86
of marks against the "gradual whittling away or dispersion of the identity
and hold upon the public mind of [a] mark or name by its use upon
noncompeting goods." 87 Schechter developed his theory of dilution from
earlier German trademark cases, including significantly the 0do188 case, in
which the German court granted the mark owner the right to prevent
registration of an identical mark on unrelated goods to protect the owner's
mark from dilution ("venotssert").89 In the United States, until 1996,
85 Schechter, supra note 42. See generally Beverly W. Pattishall, The Dilution Rationalefor TrademarkTrade Identity Protection, Its Progress and Prospects, 71 Nw. U. L REV. 618 (1976) (demonstrating the
historical situating of Schechter's article as the basis for U.S. dilution law).
86Schechter, supra note 42, at 822.
871d at 825-26. It should be noted, however, that the focus of Schechter's concern was on unique
and coined marks. In supporting his contention for stronger protection for these marks, Schechter
stated: "The rule that arbitrary, coined or fanciful marks or names should be given a much broader
degree of protection than symbols, words or phrases in common use would appear to be entirely sound."
Id at 828. Examples of marks that Schechter stated should be protected from diluting uses included
"Kodak," "Mazda," and "Blue Goose" (for fruit). See id at 828-30. Schechter goes on to state: "This
entirely arbitrary symbol would soon lose its arresting uniqueness and hence its selling power if it could
also be used on pianos, shaving cream, and fountain pens." Id at 830. These coined and fanciful marks
arguably have a much clearer distinctive nature than noncoined marks. Neither version of the Federal
Trademark Dilution Act, however, limited its protection to such unique marks. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125(c) (2006) (specifying that both inherently distinctive marks and those which acquire distinctiveness
may be protected so long as they reach the appropriate level of fame).
88Landgericht [LG] Elberfeld [Trial Court], 25Juristische Wochenschrift JM502, 1924 GRUR 204 Odol.
89 See Schechter, supra note 42, at 831-32 (quoting a German federal court which held that "complainant
has 'the utmost interest in seeing that its mark is not diluted- it would lose in selling power if everyone used it as
the designation of his goods"'). For a discussion of early Gennan cases, interestingly enough based on unfair
competition principles, in which the dilution doctrine developed, see Mathias Strasser, The Rational Basis of
Tradenark otaton Raisita tg the Di&dion Docrneinto Context, 10 FORDHAM ITfELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. LJ.
375(2000).
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trademark-dilution doctrines were developed under state trademark regimes
with the first state antidilution statute enacted by Massachusetts in 1947.90
These statutes generally protected marks against "likelihood of . .. dilution
of the distinctive quality of a mark or trade name."9'
In 1996, the United States enacted the first federal trademark dilution
statute.92 Subsequently amended in 2006,93 the present federal statute
protects "famous" marks94 against the unauthorized use of a mark or trade
name in commerce "that is likely to cause dilution by blurring or dilution by
tarnishment of the famous mark, regardless of the presence or absence of actual or
likely confusion, of competition, or of actual economic injuy."95 This absence of any

need for likely confusion-the fundamental test for delimiting the scope of
trademark protection historically-has resulted in a plethora of inconsistent
decisions in which courts rely on competition factors to determine
dilution. 96 Thus, for example, under the original Federal Trademark

9 See Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 430 (2003) (citing 1947 Mass. Acts p. 300). For
the text ofthis statute, see infra note 91.
91Mosely, 537 U.S. at 430 (quoting 1947 Mass. Acts. p. 300). A good example of the basic
language of the state anti-dilution statutes is the original Massachusetts model which provided:
likelihood of injury to business reputation or of dilution of the distinctive quality of a trade name or
trade-mark shall be a ground for injunctive relief in cases of trade-mark inflingement or unfair
competition notwithstanding the absence ofcompetition between the parties or of confusion as to the
source of goods or services.
Id (quoting 1947 Mass. Acts p. 300).
9
See Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, §§ 3-4, 109 Stat. 985, 985-96 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ ll25(c), 1127 (1994 & Supp. 1996)) (protecting "famous and distinctive" marks against unauthorized
uses that "cause( dilution of the distinctive quality of the mark"). Relief was available "regardless of the
presence or absence of competition between the owner of the famous mark and other parties, or likelihood
of confusion, mistake, or deception." Id § 1127 (defining "dilution" as "the lessening of the capacity of a famous
mark to identify and distinguish goods or services, regardless of the presence or absence of competition between
the owner of the famous mark and the other parties, or... likelihood of confusion, mistake or deception").
93 Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, §2, 120 Stat. 1730, 1730-32 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § ll25(c) (2006)).
9 One of the critical changes between the two federal dilution statutes did not deal with the issue of
competitive harm, per se, but with the scope of marks that could be protected under dilution doctrines. In the
original statute, fame was largely a reflection of the extent of use of a mark, including its use in advertising and the
amount of goods sold bearing the mark. S; eg., 15 U.S.C. § I125(c)(1)(A)-H) (1994 & Supp. 1996) (establishing
an eight-factor test for fame and distinctiveness that requires consideration of inter alia, the duration and extent
of the use of the mark and of advertising and publicity for the mark at issue). The most recent amendment has
significantly altered the number of marks that may qualify as "famous." See 15 U.S.C § I125(cX2XA) (2006).
Under the present statute, only a mark which "is widely recognized by the general consuming public of the
United States as a designation of source ofthe goods or services of the mark's owner" qualifies as famous. Id
9 Id § I 125(c)(1) (emphasis added). This protection regardless of likely confusion or competition appeared
in the original Federal Trademark Dilution Act as well. Sw 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (defining dilution as "the lessening of
the capacity ofa famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or services, regardless of the presence or absence
of competition ... or likelihood ofconfusion").
96 Se eg., Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe's Borough Coffee, Inc., 588 F.3d 97, 108 (2d Cir. 2009) (relying on
likelihood-of-confusion cases to determine if marks were sufficiently similar to qualify for dilution protection under
the 2006 revision); Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 217-22 (2d Cir. 1999) (relying on a ten-factor
test for likely dilution under the 1996 Act that closely resembled traditional likely-confusion tests); see alo 15

HeinOnline -- 49 U. Louisville L. Rev. 537 2010-2011

538

UNIVERSITY OF LOUISVILLE LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 49:517

Dilution Act, the court in Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc.,97 relied on a
multifactor test to determine whether a likelihood of dilution by blurring
existed as a result of defendant's adoption of a similar goldfish symbol for its
crackers.98 These factors were derived from earlier state dilution cases using
the six-factor Sweet test,99 and included consideration of the "similarity of the
products covered by the marks."100 The competitive nexus of the products
is a critical component of a likelihood-of-confusion analysis,oI but should
play no role in dilution analysis if, in fact, as dilution statutes contend, the
absence of competition has no impact.
By the time the first federal dilution statute was enacted in the United
States, several countries had already adopted laws protecting the reputational
value of a mark beyond the limited scope of likely confusion prohibitions,
including the European Union Trademark Harmonization Directive, which
permits member states to prohibit the unauthorized use of identical or similar
marks on goods and services dissimilar from those registered' 02 by the mark
owner where such mark "has a reputation in the Member State and where
use of that sign without due cause takes unfair advantage of, or is detrimental to,
the distinctive character or the repute of the trade mark." 0 3 Yet despite the
recognition that the commercial value of a mark should be protected due to
U.S.C. § Il25(cX2)(B)(i)-(vi) (specifying six nonexhaustive factors for detennining presence of likely dilution by
blurring including "any actual association between the mark .. . and the famous mark" under the 2006 revision).
7
NaZisco, Inc., 191 F.3d 208.
9 See id at 227.

9 S* eg., Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 875 F.2d 1026 (2d Cir. 1989) (Sweet,

J., concurring).

100Nabso, Inc., 191 F.2d at 227.
'o' S* eg., AMF Inc. v. Sleekeraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348, 350 (9th Cir. 1979) (isting the "proximity of
the goods" as a factor in confusion analysis). See gmeralv LONG, supra note 13, § 2.9 (discussing the application of
the similarity of products and services in the analysis of likely confusion).
1o2Under TRIPS Article 16, countries may generally choose to limit protection to marks that are
registered with the country in question. See TRIPS, .supranote 1, art. 16 (exclusive rights are conferred on
"the owner of a registeredtrademark" (emphasis added)). Significantly, however, registration may not be
required in the case of "well-known" marks. See Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial
Property art. 6bis, Mar. 20, 1883, 21 U.S.T. 1583 [hereinafter Paris Convention] (requiring member
countries to "prohibit the use, of a trademark which constitutes a reproduction, an imitation or a
translation, liable to create confusion, of a mark considered by the competent authority of the country
of... use to be well known in that country as being already the mark of a person entitled to the beneits of this
Convention," in other words, regardless of whether such mark has been registered (emphasis added)). In
addition, several countries, including the United States, protect marks without the need for registration,
even if the mark is not "well-known" or "famous." See e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 11 25(a)(1)(A) (2006) (providing
relief for unauthorized use of "any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof...
which is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or
association of such person with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her
goods, services, or commercial activities by another person").
1s Council Directive 89/104, art. 5(2), 1989 Oj. (L 40) 1 (EC) (emphasis added). This Directive
was replaced by Council Directive 2008/95, art. 5(2), 2008 OJ. (L 299) 28 (EC), which did not alter the
relevant language of Article 5. See also Council Regulation 207/2009, 2009 O.J. (L 78) 1, 5 (EC) (using
language similar to Article 5(2) of the Trademark Harmonization Directive).
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the investment in labor and money that a brand represents-a propertybased concern-these purported reputation-based remedies, as applied by the
courts, are not completely divorced from competition concerns. Similar to
cases in the United States that continue to rely on analogues to likelihood of
confusion in determining the scope of protection for "famous" marks,'10 the
European Union also relies upon a linking requirement to establish
reputational harm that includes likelihood of confusion as a factor in
determining whether the necessary associational link between the contested
marks exists to warrant relief.105
These developments are not undertaken in an articulated attempt to
reject or delimit the investment-protection norm for trademarks that
reputational-based relief is designed to promote. Moreover, relying on
competition-based theories to provide an arguably expanded scope of
protection under dilution theories does not resolve the confusing dichotomous
nature of trademarks. It simply ignores that such dichotomy exists.
To the extent that marks should be treated as other types of intellectual
property, where the investment interests of creators are placed at the
forefront in a rights-analysis framework, a distinctly different normative
paradigm must be created than the one that currently protects the
consumer-information value of the mark-its so-called source-designating
function. 0 6 This new normative paradigm rejects the legal fiction of
dilution-that the protection of investment interests is merely a special
benefit accorded certain marks fortunate enough to meet the shifting goal of
fame. 0 7 Instead, it recognizes a completely different right, with an
appropriately modified rights framework.

10Se

cases cited supranote 96.
Case C-252/07, Intel Corp. v. CPM U.K Ltd., 2008 E.C.R I-08823, JR 42,58 (expressly including
s See
"the existence of the likelihood ofconfusion on the part of the public" as a factor to be considered in establishing
the necessary linking while stressing that protection did not require such likely confusion); Case C-408/01,
Adidas-Salomon AG v. Fitnessworid Trading Ltd., 2003 E.C.R. 1-12537, IN29-30 ('he infringements referred
to in Article 5(2) of the Directive [involving reputational harm], where they occur, are the consequence of a
certain degree of similarity between the mark and the sign, by virtue of which the relevant section of the public
makes a connection between the sign and the mark, that is to say, establishes a link between them even though it
does not confuse them. The existence of such a link must, just like a likelihood of confusion in the context of
Article 51)(b) of the Directive, be appreciated globally, taking into account all factors relevant to the circumstances
of the case." (citation omitted)); seealo Strasser, supra note 89 (detailing some countsies' reliance on competition
theories in connection with reputation-based injuries).
106I am using the phrase "source designation" in its modem, broader sense and not in the technical sense
of literal protection for the source of the good or service in question. As indicated earlier, this source-designating
function carries with it additional consumer information about the good, including its quality and reputation.
10 For a discussion of the shifting definition of "fame" under U.S. law, see supra note 94.
5
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III. THE NEW INFORMATION/PROPERTY ASSET

In rebooting the Lanham Act to eliminate the present confusing
dichotomy regarding the goals and purposes of trademark protection, the
critical question becomes whether a trademark owner's investment interests
should be protected beyond that necessary to safeguard the traditional sourcedesignating function of marks. One potential reboot of the Lanham Act
could simply eliminate the present confusion by clarifying the test for
likelihood of confusion and eliminating any claims that do not fit clearly
within the parameters of this clarified test. 08 Reputation-based claims such
as dilution would be eliminated. Claims involving implied associations, such
as the use of keyword buys, would also largely be excluded. 0 9 This solution
has the beauty of apparent simplicity. It may also be impractical in today's
global environment given present international obligations to protect the
reputational value of marks beyond instances of consumer confusion.
Under Article 16(3) of TRIPS, of which the United States is a signatory,
member countries agree to apply the required protection of well-known
marks under Article 6bis of the Paris Convention" 0
to goods or services which are not similar to those in respect of which a
trademark is registered, provided that use of that trademark in relation to
those goods or services would indicate a connection between those goods
or services and the owner of the registered trademark and provided that
the interests of the owner of the registered trademark are likely to be
damaged by such use.II'
This obligation to prevent the reputational harm of free riding for well-known
marks must require more than protection against consumer confusion
because this type of protection is already mandated in section 1 of Article
16.112 Thus, some other measure of protection for the reputational value of a
mark must be provided. While there is increasing emphasis internationally
on the adoption of dilution protection as the method to achieve such

108Such clarification would include an analysis of the problematic role of "initial interest confusion" in
establishing the necessary associational confusion. See Bmookfield Commc'ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm't Corp., 174
F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 1999).
'" While the use of keyword buys by competitors mght be deemed to create likely confusion about the
association between their goods or services, see for example Promatek Indus., Ltd. v. Equitrac Corp., 300 F.3d
808 (7th Cir. 2002), it seems unlikely that the company actually selling the keywords creates any such confusion.
Seej.G. Wentworth, S.S.C. Ltd. Pship v. Settlement Funding LLC, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1780 (E.D. Pa. 2007).
no Paris Convention, .supra note 102, art. 6bis.
I TRIPS, mpra note 1, art. 16(3). The obligations are imposed as an agreed upon revision to Article 6bis
of the Paris Convention to apply "mutaismutndis." Id
112Seeid art. 16(1).
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protection,"t3 as demonstrated above, such solutions merely continue
trademark's confusing dichotomy without resolving the problems posed by
such an inadequately theorized form of protection. Crafting a legal regime
that protects a new right-the information-asset mark-meets the obligations
of Article 16. It simultaneously sets a framework for analysis of owners' rights
that is directly applicable to the developing competitive spaces of the digital
marketplace.
Traditional trademarks undeniably convey information about the goods
and services with which they are associated. As the historical protection of
the source-designating finction of trademarks demonstrates, their
informational significance forms a critical element to its protection." 4 The
consumer information that necessarily accompanies trademarks in their
source-designating role includes information about the source and quality of
the product,"i5 as well as lifestyle or emotional information about the
brand," 6 and the reputational value of the mark."
Beyond embedded information that assists in consumer purchasing
decisions,'" 8 trademarks in the digital era also possess "informational" values
that are unrelated to consumer product information but have value in the
new competitive spaces of the Internet, such as search-engine placement,
website addresses (domain names), and advertisements, including pop-ups.
Such informational value may develop from the same types of investments
and uses that give rise to the consumer information protected under
traditional trademark-rights analysis. But the information content that is
valued is not directly related to individual purchaser decision making. To the
contrary, similar to copyrighted works, these information-asset marks have

11 Swgera@4 DAvID S. WELKowrTZ, TRADEMARK DILUTION: FEDERAL, STATE AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW 433-48 (2002 & Supp. 2010) (containing a list of diverse dilution prutection measures intemationally). In
defending the need for the first federal trademark dilution statute, the House Report relied on the perceived need
for such protection as a result ofU.S. international treaty obligations, stating.
[Tihe recently concluded Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
including Trade in Counterfeit Goods ('TRIPS") which was part of the Uruguay Round of the
GATT agreement includes a provision designed to provide dilution protection to famous marks.
Thus, enactment of this bill will be consistent with terms of the agreement, as well as the Paris
Convention, ofwhich the U.S. is also a member.
H.R REP. No. 104-374, at 4 (1995).
11 So; eg., Dogan & Lemley, gpra note 60, at 778 (arguing that the historical goal of trademark law is to
foster the flow ofinformation to consumers, thereby reducing their search costs); Landes & Posner, .supranote 60,
at 265-66 (contending that trademark law is designed to protect market efficiency).
5
" Se Long, spra note 24, at 134-35.
6
Seeidat 125 n.3.
"' Se Id at 132-35.

118Some of this embedded infomation may well be appeals to emotions that do not necessarily lead to
rational consumer choices. Nevertheless, this "psychological function of symbols" would still be protectable
under source-designating principles because ofits impact on consumer purchasing decisions.
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value due to their expressive or emotive content. 119 As I have described
elsewhere, 20 "brands," the business term often used for this information
asset, 21 are not merely purveyors of product information, they have a
personality and culture, 22 and often become the public representation of a
business's identity and reputation. 23
The litany of decisions that have struggled to find the proper niche for
allowing unauthorized third-party uses of such information assets, often
stretching trademark law without consideration for the normative impact of
these developments, is endless. Thus, when metatags first appeared, with
their ability to alter the results of search inquiries, courts developed a new
doctrine of initial-interest confusion to deal with the potential trademark
issues associated with such issues.124 Yet at the heart of this initial-interest
confusion is not the types of confusion that traditional trademark regimes
were designed to protect. Such confusion was not directly related to the

11Copyright protection under U.S. law is limited to the expressive elements of tangible works. See 17
U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006) (providing for copyright protection for "original works of authorship fixed in any tangible
medium ofexpression"). Ideas, processes, methods of operations, concepts, or other nonexpressive elements are
outside the scope ofprotection. See id § 102(b).
120See Long, spra note 24, at 131-35.
121See id at 125 n.4.
122See id at 125 n.5 (citingJEAN NOEL KAPFERER, STRATEGIc BRAND MANAGEMENT: CREATING AND
SUSTAINING BRAND EQUpTY LONG TERM 101 (2d ed. 1997)).
123See id at 131-35. In this manner, these information assets may become closely associated with

the concept of goodwill. As discussed more fully below, goodwill is considered an integral part of a
trademark. See Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty, 264 U.S. 359, 368 (1924) ("A trademark only gives the right to
prohibit the use of it so far as to protect the owner's goodwill."). In fact it is so integral to trademark
protection that marks that are assigned without goodwill pass no rights to the assigned mark. See Sugar
Busters LLC v. Brennan, 177 F.3d 358 (5th Cir. 1999); In re Roman Cleanser Co., 802 F.2d 207, 208
(6th Cir. 1986). Some courts have held that such assignments in gross result in an abandonment of the
assigned mark. See johanna Farms, Inc. v. Citrus Bowl, Inc., 468 F. Supp. 866, 879 (E.D.N.Y. 1978)
(stating in dicta that assignment of mark without goodwill results in abandonment and that "good
intentions will not breathe life back into the devitalized mark"); Otis Elevator Co. v. Echlin Mfg. Co.,
187 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 310, 314-15 (T.T.A.B. 1975) (registration owned by predecessor in interest after
assignment in gross cancelled for abandonment). There is a facial appeal in equating "goodwill" with
"brand identity." Cf Robert G. Bone, Hunting Goodwill A Histoy ofthe Concept ofGoodwill in Trademark Law,
86 B.U. L. Rev. 547, 549 (2006) ("Goodwill protection has nothing directly to do with facilitating
consumer choice or safeguarding the quality of market information. It has to do instead with protecting
sellers from misappropriation. . . . [and] denotes the special value that attaches to a mark when the
seller's advertising and investments in quality generate consumer loyalty-a capacity to attract
consumers over time."). Such an equation arguably would place the limitations of goodwill protection
within the purview of the information-asset mark. Nevertheless, for reasons detailed below, because of
the proper relationship between consumer purchasing information and goodwill, the historical
limitations of goodwill belong with source-designating marks. See discussion infta Part IV.
t2 4 See Interstellar Starship Servs., IAd. v. Epix, Inc., 184 F.3d 1107, 1110-11 (9th Cir. 1999). Some courts
have rejected initial-interest confusion as a basis for trademark relief except in connection with Internet-based
confusion. S Gibson Guitar Corp. v. Paul Reed Smith Guitars, LP, 423 F.3d 539, 550 n.15 (6th Cir. 2005).
Others have limited its application to instances where the goods or services at issue have some competitive nexus.
See The Network Network v. CBS, Inc., No. CV 98-1349 NM(ANX), 2000 WL 362016, at *8-9 (C.D. Cal.Jan.
18,2000).
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quality or source of the goods in question. Instead it was analogized to road
signs misdirecting traffic.125
Similarly, as Internet searches and advertising techniques become
increasingly important in the digital market of the twenty-first century, the
use of trademarks for their nonpurchaser information value has increased.
One of the most hotly contested issues today is the legality of Google's
unauthorized use of third-party trademarks in its AdSense program. 26
Similar to the metatags problems of an earlier technological generation,
keywords are used by third parties to obtain a higher ranking in Internet
search results. This higher ranking is achieved by purchasing rights to
appear ranked first in a search whenever a keyword appears for which the
party has paid for such result. Often, keywords are third-party trademarks,
including the marks of a competitor. Thus, for example, a distributor of
Coca-Cola products could purchase rights to the keyword "Coke" so that
whenever someone uses that term in an Internet search his website will
appear first. He could also purchase rights under the keyword "Pepsi" to

125
In Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entertainment Corp., 174 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 1999),
one of the early cases to adopt an initial-interest confission analysis in connection with metatags, the
court defended its decision by analogizing to the confusion that arises from the posting of misleading
billboards along the highway, stating:
Using another's trademark in one's metatags is much like posting a sign with another's trademark
in fiont of one's store. Suppose West Coast's competitor (let's call it "Blockbuster") puts up a
billboard on a highway rmading"West Coast Video: 2 miles ahead at Exit 7"-where West Coast
is really located at Exit 8 but Blockbuster is located at Exit 7. Customers looking for West Coast's
store will pull off at Exit 7 and drive around looking for it. Unable to locate West Coast, but seeing
the Blockbuster store right by the highway entrance, they may simply rent there. Even consumers
who prefer West Coast may find it not worth the trouble to continue searching for West Coast since
there is a Blockbuster right there. Customers are not confused in the nanow sense: they are fully
aware that they are purchasing from Blockbuster and they have no reason to believe that Blockbuster
is related to, or in any way sponsored by, West Coast. Nevertheless, the fact that there is only initial
consumer confusion does not alter the fact that Blockbuster would be misappropriating West Coast's
acquired goodwill.
Id. at 1064. For a criticism of the court's analysis of the impact of the use of metatags on consumers, see
J.G. Wentworth, S.SC. Ltd Pship v. &ttlement Fundig LLC, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1780, 1786 (E.D. Pa.
2007) ("I respectfully disagree with the Ninth Circuit's conclusion in Brookfield. The Court asserted that
'[w]eb surfers looking for [plaintiffs] "MovieBuff" products who are taken by a search engine to
[defendant's website] will find a database similar enough ... such that a sizeable number of consumers
who were originally looking for [plaintiffs] product will simply decide to utilize [defendant's] offerings
instead.' I find this to be a material mischaracterization of the operation of Internet search engines. At
no point are potential consumers 'taken by a search engine' to defendant's website due to defendant's
use of plaintiffs marks in meta tags. Rather, as in the present case, a link to defendant's website appears
on the search results page as one of many choices for the potential consumer to investigate. As stated
above, the links to defendant's website always appear as independent and distinct links on the search
result pages regardless of whether they are generated through Google's AdWords program or search of
the keyword meta tags of defendant's website. Further, plaintiff does not allege that defendant's
advertisements and links incorporate plaintiffs marks in any way discernable to internet users and
potential customers." (citation omitted)).
126&ergmerahv CwgeAdSmse, GOOGLE.CoM, http://www.google.com/adsense (ast visited Feb. 22,2011).
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achieve the same result. Such use does not involve the source-designating
function of a mark. But it clearly invokes its informational value.
Moreover, such information clearly has commercial value. Google has
earned approximately 30% of its total revenues in the first quarter of 2010
on its keyword program alone.127
Because keywords do not use marks to represent the source of goods or
provide information about them, their use does not fall cleanly within
Battles have been hard fought and
traditional trademark analysis.
unfortunately inconclusive. Courts have disagreed over so fundamental an
issue as whether trademarks used as keywords qualify as an actionable "use
in commerce" 28 falling within the strictures of the Lanham Act.' 29
The ongoing failure of U.S. trademark law to treat effectively the right
of a mark owner's ability to control the use of its mark apart from its
traditional source-designating function could be resolved by acknowledging
the existence of the information-asset mark and creating an appropriate
legal regime to protect this mark. Unlike currently recognized marks under
the Lanham Act, protection for this information-asset mark would be
provided without regard to consumer confusion. Such confusion would be
irrelevant to any determination of rights because the information-asset mark
is not concerned with traditional trademark uses. It does not carry the
consumer purchasing information that traditional trademark rights regulate
because it is not a mark in the traditional sense. It is not used in connection
with goods or services. Or, more specifically, such uses do not fall within
the purview of the rights that are protected for an information-asset mark.
To the contrary, the protection of the information-asset mark is based solely

127 Se, Google Awamces Fst Quartr 2010 Fmancial Resuks, GOOGLE.COM (Apr. 15, 2010),
http://investor.google.com/eamings/2010/Ql-google-eamings.html (stating that Google reported revenues of
$2.04 billion during the first quarter fmm its Ad Sense program, which represented 30% oftotal revenues for that
period).
128
To qualify for protection, a mark must be used in commerce. The commercial-use requirement has
two prongs. The first is that the mark must be used in "commerce" as defined by section 45 ofthe Lanham Act
and delineated by the constitutional obligations of a sufficient commercial nexus to qualify for enactment under
the Commerce Clause. This obligation is met by using a mark in interstate or foreign commerce or in commerce
with Indian tribes. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006) (defining "commerce" as "all commerce which may lawfully be
regulated by Congress"). The second prong of the commercial-use test requires that the mask be used in
commerce as a mark. Section 45 requires that trademark for goods be "placed in any manner on the goods or
their containers or the displays associated therewith, or on the tags or labels affixed thereto, or if the nature ofthe
goods makes such placement impracticable, then on documents associated with the goods or their sale." Id For
service marks, section 45 requires the marks be "used or displayed in the sale or advertising of services." Id
19
2 The issue of whether Internet uses of marks such as in metatags, keyword buys, or to trigger pop-up
advertisements qualifies as an actionable use in commerce has led to conflicting decisions to date. Compar
Rescuecom Corp. v. Google Inc., 562 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 2009) (finding a potentially actionable use in commerce
from use of plaintifiPs mark in a keyword buy), with 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 414 F.3d 400,40910, 414 (2d Cir. 2005) (no use in commerce frm use ofplaintiffs mark to trigger a pop-up advertisement).
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on protecting the trademark owner's investment interest in his mark. This
investment interest is represented by the informational value of the mark,
separate from its source-designating function.
IV. CRAYFING A LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE INFORMATION-ASSET

MARK
Since the protection of information-asset marks does not fall within the
parameters of traditional consumer-protection doctrines, the scope of their
protection would not be delimited by the historical norms of likely
confusion, "trademark use in commerce," and associated doctrines. To the
contrary, like copyrights, third-party uses of information-asset marks would
be encouraged-particularly where such uses assist in creating new
competitive spaces in the digital market. 30 To achieve these dual goals of
protection and access, however, several difficult normative questions remain
to be answered.
A. Setting the Parametersofthe Information Asset

The Lanham Act has established a fairly low threshold for symbols to
qualify for trademark protection. The test of distinctiveness' 3' may be
sufficient to determine whether commercial symbols have the legal potential
to become recognizable source designators for the relevant purchasing
public.132 But such a test for the potentially expanded rights that trademark

1seThus, for example, an expanded fair use doctrine similar to that established under the Copyright Act, 17
U.S.C. § 107 (2006), might be desirable to pemit certain informational uses that are deemed critical to the
development of the digital market. S* eg., Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 815, 819-20, 822 (9th Cir.
2003) (use ofthumbnails of copyrighted works in Internet search results considered a fair transformative use).
131To qualify for protection under the Lanham Act, a mark must be capable of distinguishing the
associated goods or services of the owner flmm others. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (2006) ("No trademark by which the
goods ofthe applicant may be distinguished fmm the goods of others shall be refused registration on the principle
register."); s&, also TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 15 (defining a trademark as "[a]ny sign, or any combination ofsigns,
capable of distinguishing the goods or services of one undertaking from those of other undertakings"). Under the
Lanham Act, trademarks are further divided in two levels of distinctiveness. Fanciful, arbitrary, coined, and
suggestive marks are considered inherently distinctive and are subject to protection upon a bona fide use in
commerce as a mark. See Abererombie & Ftch Co. v. Hunting Wodd, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 8-9, 11 (2d Cir. 1976).
Descriptive and other marks such as product configurations are considered to have acquired distinctiveness and
must be used for a sufficient period of time to develop secondary meaning among the relevant public before they
qualify for protection. Id at 9-10; see aLo Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205 (2000) (all
product configurations require secondary meaning).
2
Of course, such legal distinctiveness does not make a brand recognizable as a practical matter. Instead,
marks must be used in commerce and investments in advertising and the like made before any mark comes to
represent a particular product or quality to the public. See Barton Beebe, The Somotic Anoysis of TradmaarkLaw, 51
UCIA L REV. 621 (2004) (describing the interaction between consumers and marks in establishing commercial
meanings for trademarks).
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owners would be granted in an information-asset mark would pose a serious
threat of monopolization. It would grant to the first adopter a virtual
monopoly over their selected mark on any good or service no matter how
competitively disconnected they may be. To avoid such monopolistic
tendencies, some standard higher than legal distinctiveness must be required,
particularly since the ameliorating effect of consumer confusion or some other
competitive nexus on such monopolistic tendencies forms no part of the
information-asset rights paradigm. Even Schechter in his early proposal for
dilution protection focused on the protection of coined or fanciful marks.'
While the current version of federal trademark dilution expressly removes any
differentiation between acquired and inherent distinctiveness,134 such
distinction may well be critical in limiting the over-expansive application of
this new rights paradigm.
At a minimum, an information-asset mark must achieve some level of
renown to justify the expanded protection of the informational value of the
mark beyond the limits of competition and consumer confusion. Current
standards for well-known or famous marks may prove a useful starting place
for this new rights paradigm. However, simply using the term "famous"
without considering what type of renown is actually implicated by an
information-asset right would merely continue the already frustrating
confusion that surrounds present famous-mark protection.
The definition of what qualifies as a "famous" mark protected under
federal dilution statutes has changed over time. The original dilution statute
included regional 3 5 and niche marks 36 within the scope of marks protected
against the harm of dilution. It provided an eight-factor test for determining
whether a mark qualified as "famous" under the statute.137 These factors
focused primarily on the scope of use of the mark138 and its strength.' 39 By
contrast, under the Revised Trademark Dilution Act, the number of marks
that qualify for heightened protection has been reduced. Niche marks are
excluded.140 Instead, only a mark that "is widely recognized by the general

133See Schechter, supranote 42, at 832.

13 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2006) (providing protection to famous marks that are "distinctive, inherently or
though acquired distinctiveness").
15 See WaWa, Inc. v. Haaf, 40 U.S.P.Q2d (BNA) 1629,1631 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
136Se Times MNor Magazines, Inc. v. Las Vegas Sports News, LLC., 212 F.3d 157, 164 (3d Cir. 2000).
1 See 15 U.S.C. § I l25(cXI)(A)-( (1994 & Supp. 1996).
'3 Such scope included the duration, geographical extent, and channels of trade for the mark and its
related goods, services, and advertising. S id § 1l 25(cX)(BhE).
1 Seeid § 1125(cXIXA), (F)-(G).
4 See H.R. REP. No. 109-23, at 8 (2005) CThe legislation expands the threshold of'fame' and thereby
denies protection for marks that are famous only in 'niche' markets.").
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consuming public of the United States as a designation of source of the
goods or services of the mark's owner" is protected.14 ' The statute
continues to provide statutory factors to determine fame. These factors,
however, have been reduced to four, which focus primarily on the scope of
use of the mark to determine renown.142 No consideration of renown based
solely on the strength of the mark is included.143
In addition to dilution protection, U.S. trademark law also protects
"famous marks" under the common-law "famous marks" doctrine.144
Designed to meet U.S. obligations under Article 6bis of the Paris
Convention,145 this doctrine contains additional standards for determining
whether a mark is "famous." In Grupo Gigante SA de CVv. Dallo & Co.,'14 the
court stated that "a substantial percentage of consumers in the relevant
American market [must be] familiarwith the foreign market." 47 In Empresa
Cubana Del Tabaco v. Culbro Corp.,148 by contrast, the court considered
secondary-meaning factors to determine if a mark had a "known
reputation."1 49 In crafting a rebooted Lanham Act to protect informationasset marks, the methodology for determining the appropriate level of
renown must be clearly set forth. To reduce unwanted monopolization of
common terms, the strength of the mark should be a critical, if not
determinative, factor in determining whether a mark has sufficient
informational value beyond its source-designating significance to warrant
protection. If a level of renown less than nationwide fame is ultimately
required, then the rights of the holder of such an information-asset mark

14115 U.S.C. §I 125(c)(2)(A) (2006).
142Se id § 1125(cX2)(A)(i)-(iv). These factors focus on the "duration, extent, and geographic reach of
advertising and publicity of the mark" and "[t]he amount, volume, and geographic extent of sales of goods or
services offered under the mark." Id § I125(c)(2XA)(i)-ii).
143 The only "renown" factor considered is "the extent of actual recognition of the mark." Id
§ 1I25(c)(2)(A)(iii). It is not dear if this factor will include consideration of the strength of the mark, although the
explicit reference to actual recognition would appear to require direct evidence of renown such as surveys. The
House Report is silent on the issue.
144It is not dear to what extent the common-law doctrine is applicable to the Lanham Act. In ITC Ltd v.
Pwmcgira, Inc., 482 F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 2007), the Second Cireuit explicitly rejected any such doctrine under the
Lanham Act. Although this decision arguably established a direct conflict with decisions by other circuits to the
contrary, for example, Gnho Gigante M De CVa. allo & Co, 391 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 2004), the Supreme Court
denied certiorari. Sm ITC IUd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 552 U.S. 827 (2007).
'4 S* eg., CGoo gateSA D CV 391 F.3d at 1099. Article 6bis of the Paris Convention requires countries
to protect well-known marks even without domestic registrations. See Pans Convention, supra note 102, art. 6bis.
For a more detailed discussion ofArticle 6bis, see supra note 102.
I- Gruo GrgteS4 D CV 391 F.3d 1088.
'4 Id at 1098 (second emphasis added).
'4 Empresa Cubana Del Tabaco v. Culbso Corp., 70 U.S.P.Q2d (BNA) 1650 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), rm'd on
othergromis, 399 F.3d 462 (2d Cir. 2005).
'4 See id at 1676-77.
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should be similarly restricted because the investment interest to be protected
is less than for a nationally famous mark.
The scope of protection for an information-asset mark should not follow
50
the current confusion-based tests for infringement under the Lanham Act,
because what is protected is the investment interest in the information-asset
mark. Instead, the scope of protection should follow the controlled-uses
model of copyright and patent law.15' The revised statute should specify the
types of uses that the trademark owner has the power to do or authorize in
connection with the information-asset mark. This specification should follow
the positive-rights model of copyright law. Unlike copyright, however, such
uses should be commercial in nature. Noncommercial uses should continue
to fall outside the scope of Lanham Act protection.152
Unlike copyrights and patents, trademarks have no specific durational
limitation.' 53 To the contrary, so long as a mark does not lose its
distinctiveness,154 it can continue to be protected against unauthorized uses.
This differing treatment is the direct result of the absence of any temporal
limitation imposed by the Commerce Clause. So long as the federal
protection of information-asset marks is limited to commercial uses in
commerce that can be regulated by Congress, 55 no durational limit is
required. In the absence of any such limitation, however, the legislation
establishing an information-asset mark will most likely be challenged as a
violation of the "limited times" obligation under the Copyrights and Patents
Clause of the Constitution.156 While the Trade-Mark Cases 57 held that such

150See

15 U.S.C. §§1114, 1125(a) (2006).

17 U.S.C. §106 (2006) (listing the acts that copyright owners are authorized to do and permit others
to do with their copyrighted works); 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2006) (listing the acts that patent owners may prohibit in
connection with their patented inventions).
eg., 15 U.S.C. § 1125(cX3)(B)-(q (expressly excluding from dilution prohibitions "[a]ll forms ofnews
152
reporting and news commentary" and "[a]ny noncommercial use of a mark"). The statute also excludes
parodies, criticism, and comments "upon the famous mark owner or the goods or services of the famous mark
owner." Id § 11 25(c)(3XAXii).
153 Cunently, copyrights last for seventy years after the death of the author. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2006).
Patents generally last twenty years from the date ofapplication. 35 U.S.C. § 154(aX2) (2006).
154 Such loss of distinctiveness can occur in numerous ways, including genericide. Se 15 U.S.C. § 1127
(2006) (defining abandonment as including "acts of omission as well as commission ... [that] causefl the mark to
become the generic name for the goods or services on or in connection with which it is used or otherwise to lose
as a mark"); sm also supra note 63.
its significance
5
1 5 This includes commercial uses in interstate and foreign commerce, and commerce with Indian tribes.
See U.S. CoNSTr. art. I, § 8, d. 3 ("Congress shall have the Power ... To regulate Commerce with foreign
."); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (defining
Nations, and among the several States and with the Indian Tribes .
commerce under the Lamham Act as "all commerce which may lawfully be regulated by Congress").
5
6 See U.S. Const. art I, § 8, cl. 8 (restricting the power of Congress to protect copyrights and patents by
granting exclusive rights "for limited Times").
157Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879).
151Sm
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clause could not form the basis for the 1870 federal trademark statute on the
grounds of lack of creativity in origination,'5 8 the more information assets
approach the property-like nature of copyrights and patents, the more likely
they will be considered an attempt to circumvent the durational requirements
of the Copyrights and Patents Clause.' 59 Such challenge, however, should
ultimately prove unsuccessful since information-asset marks continue to gain
their value through use as opposed to creation.16 0

B. Resisting the Impulse Toward Monopolization
Protecting information-asset marks as a property investment should not
give owners absolute rights over every use of the mark. At a minimum,
because of the need for marks to qualify for protection under the strictures of
the Commerce Clause, the permitted uses must be expressly commercial in
nature. To avoid the potential monopolization of commercial speech that
could occur as a result of an overly expansive application of rights to
information-asset marks, the protection of such marks must further be subject
to the same exceptions that apply to source-designating marks for
noncommercial speech.161 Moreover, since the new information-asset mark is
being protected for its informational or speech values, additional limitations
should be crafted to assure adequate access by third parties to the purely
informational aspects of such marks. Such limitations should be modeled on
the fair use limitations of copyright,162 and subject to the same considerations
64
of market efficiencyl 63 and social benefit.1

158See id at 93-94 (describing the development of trademarks as "often the result of accident' possessing
"neither originality, invention, discovery, science, nor art").
59
See United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1281 (11th Cir. 1999).
16oSee id (holding that Congress may enact copyright-like protection under the Commerce Clause under
certain conditions).
161See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3) (2006) (providing exceptions to dilution protection for noncommercial speech);
see also supra note 152. In addition to exceptions for noncommercial speech, information-asset marks should also
be subject to the full panoply of exceptions required under the First Amendment. Se e.g.,Cliffi Notes, Inc. v.
Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ'g Group, Inc., 886 F.2d 490, 494 (2d Cir. 1989) (upholding parody of plaintiffs
Cliffi Notes, stressing that the Lanham Act should be construed to apply to artistic works "only where the public
interest in avoiding consumer confusion outweighs the public interest in firee expression" (quoting Rogers v.
Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 1989))); LL Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 33 (1st Cir.
1987) ('The Constitution does not, however, perit the range of the anti-dilution statute to encompass the
unauthorized use of a trademark in a non-commercial setting such as an editorial or artistic context.").
162
S& 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
163Se e.g.,Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994) (examining the impact of
market availability on fair-use defenses); see alto Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Faikae: A Sructsural and
FosnmcAnauis oft eBetanar Case andIts hdassors, 82 COLUL L REV. 1600, 1601, 1604 (1982) (an early work
regarding the role of market efficiencies in connection with fair-use determinations); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Fair
Use andMarket Faiko- Sony Raisiail 82 B.U. L REV. 975, 985-89 (2002) (disputing Gordon's analysis and arguing
that unauthorized copying should be considered fair when the net benefit received by society outweighs the loss
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By crafting a new rights regime for information-asset marks, new
potential revenue streams for the holders of such marks will need to be
developed. These new revenue streams will develop as new competitive
spaces are developed. Just as copyright law has adapted to the benefits and
challenges of the digital marketplace, trademarks need to make similar
accommodations. Such accommodations will include the development of
new digital licensing models for the use of information-asset marks by third
parties. Since the closest analogue to the information-asset mark is a digital
copyrighted work, digital licensing models for such works, including for
example, the present Sound Exchange performing rights165 and Creative
Commons 66 licensing schemes, could serve as beneficial models.167
Critically, however, these new licensing mechanisms should include limited
compulsory licenses for information-asset marks. While such licenses at first
blush appear to burden the flow of information in the digital market, they
actually return a balance to that marketplace by treating information-asset
marks like other forms of intellectual property, where social uses are
balanced against traditional compensation rights through carefully
structured compulsory licenses. As opposed to restricting the use of
information assets by third parties, the licensing of these assets could be the
first step toward creating new norms that support the flourishing of new uses
of information-asset marks.
One of the difficulties in establishing compulsory licenses, or even
expanded fair-use rights, for information-asset marks is the historical
prohibition against such licenses. 68 Because of the source-designating
function of trademarks, under U.S. law, if a mark is licensed to be used by a

generated by the copying).
1 Sm, eg., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) (relying on the "social benefit' of
pamdies "by shedding light on an earlier work, and, in the process, creating a new one" to support its finding that
plaintiffs rap parody qualified as a fair use); Sony Corp. ofAm. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 454
(1984) (analyzing the societal benefits time shifting provides to detennine whether it qualifies as a fair use). Sz
gmealy Pierre N. Leval, Tzrwd a Fair Use Stndard, 103 HARV. L REv. 1105 (1990) (presenting an eariy but
infonnative analysis ofsocial-benefit theories; relied on to support transformation defense in Campbel).
165 Sound Exchange is a performing rights organization that collects and distributes digital performance
rights royalties in the United States. See gmeral Get Paid When ou Get lYad, SOUND EXCHANGE,
http://soundexchange.com/performer-owner/perfouner-srco-home/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2011).
16 Creative Commons is a nonprofit organization that offers several types of model licenses to permit the
uncompensated licensing of copyrighted materials. Se geealy Abot the Iacenser, CREATIVE COMMONS,
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/ (last visited Feb. 24,2011).
I67 Se eg., Katie Pimentel, Comment, Tradenar* Use as Irvrds A Conparadie Imk at Tradwnak Use as
Kyrwrd in PaidSarch andDigit Publ PomaceRightfor SodRorirgs,9J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL PROP. L
553, 573 (2010) (proposing a congressionally regulated compulsory license for keyword buys modeled on digital
performance rights under copyright).
168
For an early examination of some of the issues raised by compulsory licenses for trademarks, see J.
Thomas McCarthy, Compulsory Licouig of a Tradarmk Roaedy or Pnalpi?, 67 TRADEAARK REP. 197, 228-29,
231-33 (1977).

HeinOnline -- 49 U. Louisville L. Rev. 550 2010-2011

REBOOTING TRADEMARKS

2011]

551

third party, the trademark owner must maintain the right to control the
quality of the goods or services offered under the mark.'69 Failure to
exercise adequate control qualifies as abandonment because the mark loses
its source-designating function.170 Given the critical relationship of quality
control to the value of a mark as an information signifier, compulsory
licensing of trademarks has long been prohibited. This prohibition is so
strong that it is a standard principle of international trademark law. Article
21 of TRIPS, for example, expressly prohibits the compulsory licensing of
trademarks.' 7' Such prohibitions make sense in the case of sourcedesignating trademarks. Yet, just as the doctrine of likelihood of confusion
should play no role in the determination of rights in an information-asset
mark, similarly, compulsory-licensing prohibitions should be equally
inapplicable. Use of information-asset marks does not implicate the critical
consumer-information role of trademarks. Consequently, so long as
compulsory uses are restricted to those uses that do not adversely impact the
investment value of the information-asset mark, they should not be
prohibited. Thus, because the use of trademarks for keyword buys arguably
reduces consumer search costs and provides critical informational support
for the digital market, such use could be required under a compulsory
license. The use of an information-asset mark in such a fashion would cause
no harm to the trademark owner's investment interest. To the contrary, it
is receiving compensation for the informational use of its mark. To the
extent that the use of the mark in such a fashion causes harm, for example,
by associating the mark with a pornographic website or through other
tarnishing acts, 7 2 such use should fall outside the scope of permissible
compulsory uses and be readily prohibited.

69

See
Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart's Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358, 366 (2d Cir. 1959).
o See
eg., Bastamerica Intl USA Trust v. Tyfield Importers, Inc., 289 F.3d 589, 598 (9th Cir. 2002)
("[Naked licensing, without any control over the quality of goods produced by the licensee ... is ihamt deceOve
and constitutes abandonment of any rights to the trademark by the licensor." (quoting First Interstate Bancorp v.
Stenquist, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1704, 1706 (N.D. Cal. 1990))).
171 See TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 21 ("Members may determine conditions on the licensing and
assignment of trademarks, it being understood that the compulsory licensing of trademarks shall not be
permitted and that the owner of a registered trademark shall have the right to assign the trademark with or
without the transfer of the business to which the trademark belongs.").
172Tamishment has been broadly defined as linking a trademark "'to products of shoddy quality,
or is portrayed in an unwholesome or unsavory context,' with the result that 'the public will associate
that lack of quality or lack of prestige in the defendant's goods with the plaintiffs unrelated goods."'
Hormel Foods Corp. v.Jim Henson Prods., Inc., 73 F.3d 497, 507 (2d Cir. 1996) (quoting Deere & Co.
v. MTD Prods., Inc., 41 F.3d 39, 43 (2d Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Ringling
Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. B.E. Windows Corp., 937 F. Supp. 204, 209
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (defining tarnishment as unauthorized use of trademarks in connection with "inferior or
unwholesome goods or services," such as "obscenity, sexual activity or illegal activity" (citing Hormel Food
Corp., 73 F.3d at 507; Deere & Co., 41 F.3d at 43; Chemical Corp. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 306 F.2d 433
'
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Establishing compulsory licenses for information-asset marks would not
violate present U.S. or international prohibitions against such licenses
because the information-asset mark is not the source identifier protected by
such prohibitions. Such compulsory licenses also do not implicate the
protection of the goodwill that lies at the heart of trademark protection for
source-designating marks.
"Goodwill" is undefined under the Lanham Act, but is a necessary
adjunct in the assignment of any registered or applied-for mark. 7 3 It has
been variously defined as "a spirit that hovers over the physical,"' 74 "the
favorable regard of the purchasing public," 7 5 "the expectancy of continued
patronage," 76 and "the intangible value of a business beyond the value of
its physical assets." 7 7 Goodwill plays a critical role in the existence and
valuation of source-designating marks. In language that has been constantly
relied upon to explain this interrelationship, the Supreme Court in United

Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co.' 78 held:
There is no such thing as property in a trade-mark except as a right
appurtenant to an established business or trade in connection with which
the mark is employed.... [T] he right to a particular mark grows out of its
use, not its mere adoption; its function is simply to designate the goods as

(5th Cir. 1962); Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 467 F. Supp. 366
(S.D.N.Y. 1979), afd, 604 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1979))). Use of trademarks as domain names for
pornographic websites is also generally found to be tarnishing or qualify as cybersquatting. See Mattel
Inc. v. Internet Dimensions Inc., 55 U.S.P.Q2d (BNA) 1620, 1627 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) ("Even more to the
point, a mark can be tarnished when its likeness is placed in the context of sexual activity, obscenity, or
illegal activity. Mattel here essentially claims that linking BARBIE with pornography will adversely
color the public's impressions of BARBIE. I agree. The BARBIE doll has been associated with
wholesomeness by generations of preteen girls. The BARBIE dolls, with their long blonde hair and
anatomically improbable dimensions, are ostensibly intended to portray wholesomeness to young girls.
The 'models' on the 'barbiesplaypen.com' site, although many have long blonde hair and anatomically
improbable dimensions, can in no way be described as engaging in 'wholesome' activities." (citations
omitted)). But see L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 27, 31-33 (1st Cir. 1987)
(finding use of "L.L. Beam's Back-to-School-Sex-Catalog" was not tarnishing since the parody was
noncommercial and stating that "[n]either the strictures of the first amendment nor the history and
theory of anti-dilution law permit a finding of tarnishment based solely on the presence of an
unwholesome or negative context in which a trademark is used without authorization").
173 See 15 U.S.C. § 1060(a)(1) (2006) ("A registered mark or a mark for which an application to register has
been filed shall be assignable with the good will of the business in which the mark is used, or with that part of the
good will of the business connected with the use of and symbolized by the mark.").
114 Smith v. Davidson, 31 S.E2d 477, 479 (Ga. 1944) ("It is difficult to conceive of the good will of a
business . . . as a thing of forn and substance. It is more like a spirit that hovers over the physical, a sort of
atmosphere that surrounds the whole; the aroma that springs from the conduct ofthe business; the favorable hue
or reflection which the trade has become accustomed to associate with a particular location or under a certain
name.").
17 Premier-Pabst Corp. v. Elm City Brewing Co., 9 F. Supp. 754, 757 (D. Conn. 1935).
176Boe v. Comm'r, 307 F.2d 339, 343 (9th Cir. 1962).
17 I McCARTHY, ssra note 55, § 2:19.
178United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90 (1918).
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the product of a particular trader and to protect his good will against the
sale of another's product as his . . . .1
Yet despite this critical interface, goodwill remains an evanescent concept.
While most concede that goodwill includes the concept of reputation, the
precise effect of assigning a trademark without its goodwill is unclear. Some
courts maintain that an assignment in gross (without goodwill) results in the
abandonment of the mark. 8 0 Others treat such an assignment as a
contractual failure of the assignment of a priority right that does not prevent
the assignee from using the mark.181 Even more problematic, while the
present obligation of goodwill transfer does not include the transfer of
physical business assets,' 82 the failure to use an assigned mark on the same
quality goods may result in an abandonment of the mark.'83 Thus, for
example, an alteration in the formula for baking powder by substituting
phosphate for alum was sufficient to result in trademark forfeiture.' 84
Despite the relationship between reputation and trademarks that
goodwill broadly represents, this relationship does not implicate the
informational values that attach to the information-asset mark. As the court
in Sugar Busters LLC v. Brennan' 5 recognized: "The purpose of the rule
prohibiting the sale or assignment of a trademark in gross is to prevent a
consumer from being misled or confused as to the source and nature of the
goods or services that he or she acquires." 86 This source-confusion role fits
within the normative framework of the source-designating mark. It does
not fit so readily within the nonconsumer purchasing information protected

at 97 (citing Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 412-14 (1916)).
S&Johanna Farms, Inc. v. Citrus BowlA, Inc., 468 F. Supp. 866, 879 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (stating that
assignment ofmark without goodwill results in abandonment).
181S*; eg., Clark & Freeman Corp. v. Heartland Co., 811 F. Supp. 137 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); 3 MCCARTHY,
supra note 55, § 18:27 & nn.2-13.
82 See, e.g.,Glamorene Prods. Corp. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 538 F.2d 894, 895-96 (C.C.P.A.
1976) ("[Transfer of tangible assets (inventory, labels, customer lists, formulas, etc.) is not necessary to
an effective trademark assignment." (citing Sterling Brewers, Inc. v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 441 F.2d 675
(C.C.P.A. 1971); Hy-Cross Hatchery, Inc. v. Osborne, 303 F.2d 947 (C.C.P.A. 1962))). For a history
and rationale of the assignment in gross rules for trademarks, see generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
UNFAIR COMPETITION §34 cmt. b (1995).
183S &g., PepsiCo, Inc., v. Grapette Co., 416 F.2d 285, 288 (8th Cir. 1969) ("Basic to this concept is the
proposition that any assignment of a trademark and its goodwill (with or without tangibles or intangibles assigned)
requires the mark itself be used by the assignee on a product having substantially the same characteristics." (citing
Atlas Beverage Co. v. Minneapolis Brewing Co., 113 F.2d 672 (8th Cir. 1940); W.T. Wagner's Sons Co. v.
Orange Snap Co., 18 F.2d 554 (5th Cir. 1927); Indep. Baking Powder Co. v. Boorman, 175 F. 448 (C.C.D.NJ.
1910); H.H. Scott, Inc. v. Annapolis Electroacoustic Corp., 195 F. Supp. 208 (D. Md. 1961))).
84
SIndp.Bakg PouerCa, 175 F. at 455.
1 Sugar Busters LLC v. Brennan, 177 F.3d 258 (5th Cir. 1999).
86Id at 265 (citing Visa, U.SA, Inc. v. Birmingham Trust Nat1 Bank, 696 F.2d 1371, 1375 (Fed. Cir.
1982)).
19 Id
'8
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by the information-asset mark. 8 7 Consequently, traditional prohibitions
against compulsory licenses and assignments in gross should be inapplicable
to these marks. Furthermore, in light of the need to prevent potential
monopolization of commercial speech that the adoption of an information
asset may create, such licenses may need to be liberally applied.
V. CONCLUSION
Rebooting the Lanham Act to include recognition of a new informationasset mark will not suit everyone. Trademark owners will gain the recognized
right to control certain uses of their trademarks divorced from the limitations
of consumer confusion that have proven so challenging in the digital
marketplace. At the same time, if this reboot is to be successful, mark owners
will also lose a certain amount of control over the informational aspects of
their marks as they are subjected to the necessary limitations of expanded fair
use and compulsory licensing. Treating information assets like other forms
of intellectual property-where socially beneficial uses are balanced against
traditional compensation rights through carefully structured fair use and
compulsory-licensing rights-could be the first step toward creating new
norms that support the flourishing of new uses of trademarks in the evolving
competitive spaces of the digital marketplace. But such new uses can only
occur if we reboot the Lanham Act to end the confusing dichotomy of the
present trademark regime and allow trademarks to become full members of
the intellectual property "club."

187 But c Bone, supm note 123, at 549 (contending that goodwill protection is connected to
misappropriation ofa trademark owner's property right).
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